DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
To vacate a default, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action ( see CPLR 5015[a]; Sicari v. Hung Yuen Wong, 286 A.D.2d 489). The plaintiffs' counsel's bare allegations of law office failure on the part of prior counsel cannot serve as the basis to set aside a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 ( see Gourdet v. Hershfeld, 277 A.D.2d 422; Eretz Funding v. Shalosh Assocs., 266 A.D.2d 184; Spatz v. Bajramoski, 214 A.D.2d 436; Blackman v. Blackman, 131 A.D.2d 801, 805). Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence sufficient to satisfy the serious injury threshold set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Sarot v. Yusufov, 301 A.D.2d 512; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 A.D.2d 435). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.
ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, McGINITY, ADAMS and MASTRO, JJ., concur.