DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the convictions of sexual abuse in the first degree under the fifth count of the indictment and sexual abuse in the second degree under the eleventh count of the indictment, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of his uncharged acts of abuse and violence against the mother and brother of the child victim ( see People v. Cook, 93 N.Y.2d 840; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233; People v. Medunjanin, 276 A.D.2d 719; People v. Wright, 266 A.D.2d 414; People v. Gargano, 222 A.D.2d 694; People v. George, 197 A.D.2d 588). The trial court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice ( see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359-360).
The People correctly concede that two of the defendant's convictions, for first and second degree sexual abuse, must be vacated, since those counts of the indictment (counts 5 and 11) were dismissed before the trial and were mistakenly submitted to the jury ( see People v. Smiley, 303 A.D.2d 425, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 542; People v. Harris, 229 A.D.2d 595). However, reversal of the remaining counts is not warranted because the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of evidence regarding the dismissed counts ( see People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 499; People v. Smiley, supra; People v. Williams, 292 A.D.2d 474).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
ALTMAN, J.P., FLORIO, FRIEDMANN and MASTRO, JJ., concur.