WIESE, Judge.
I PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a civil case commenced by a two-count complaint dated August 15, 2001. Briefly stated, the plaintiff has alleged causes of action sounding in negligence against two defendants, Lawrence A. Cross, Jr. and Sharon L. Greenfield. The plaintiff alleges that she was operating her motor vehicle on September 23, 1999 on a public road when she was struck from the rear by two other motor vehicles. The plaintiff contends that the vehicle directly behind her was operated by Greenfield. She further alleges that a second vehicle located behind Greenfield was operated by Cross. The plaintiff contends that the defendants while in the negligent operation of their vehicles struck her vehicle from the rear causing her physical injuries and property damage. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for these injuries and losses.
Greenfield has moved the court for summary judgment. Greenfield maintains that there is no genuine issue of material fact because her vehicle was stationary at the time of the collision and therefore she could not be negligent. The plaintiff has filed an objection to the instant motion. Both parties have provided the court with affidavits and other supporting materials. The court heard oral argument on October 20, 2003.
II DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and CT Page 12892 that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gould v. Mellick Sexton, 263 Conn. 140, 146, 819 A.2d 216 (2003). "[T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).
"Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn. App. 252, 258, 815 A.2d 263 (2003), quoting Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984); see also Webb v. Denny's Inc., Superior. Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 99 049435S (April 30, 2002, Wiese, J.).
The court having examined the documents provided by the parties finds that summary judgment is not appropriate in this matter. A genuine issue of material fact exists concerning operation of Greenfield's vehicle and the time of the accident.
III CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above the motion for summary judgment is denied.
So ordered. CT Page 12893