DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the petitioner was not entitled to a tax exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a(1) or (3). The petitioner failed to demonstrate that its property was used exclusively for one or more of the exempt purposes set forth in RPTL 420-a(1)(a) ( see Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah v. Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 N.Y.2d 244, 249; Matter of Swedenborg Found. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 93-94; Matter of Association of Bar of City of N.Y. v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 153). Nor did the petitioner demonstrate entitlement to an exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a(3) ( see Economic Opportunity Commn. of Nassau County v. Village of Hempstead, 148 A.D.2d 570; Congregation K'hal Torath Chaim v. Town of Ramapo, 72 A.D.2d 804, 805). Thus, there was a rational basis for the respondents' determination that the petitioner failed to establish entitlement to an exemption from real estate taxes ( see RPTL 420-a; Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 230-231; Matter of Marble Masonic Historical Socy. v. Tuckahoe Assessment Review Bd., 262 A.D.2d 487, 488).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.
SMITH, J.P., McGINITY, H. MILLER and RIVERA, JJ., concur.