GASTON v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

JAMES KING, Senior District Judge

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 1, 2003. On October 22, 2003, Plaintiff filed his Response.

On October 15, 2002, Plaintiff filed his Complaint On February 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint, which contains four counts. In Counts I, II, and III, Plaintiff claims he was demoted, subjected to a hostile work environment, and ultimately fired because of his race and national origin. Count IV alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII. Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was fired in retaliation for reporting the racial slurs directed at him by one of his supervisors.

In its current Motion, Defendant argues as to Counts I and II that Defendant fired Plaintiff for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, and Plaintiff failed to make Defendant aware of the hostile nature of his work environment. Defendant argues as to Count III that the local law cited by Plaintiff does not permit this suit, and Defendant argues as to Count IV that Defendant was not aware of Plaintiff's report against his supervisor until after Plaintiff was fired. In his Response, Plaintiff argues that he was fired because of his race and because he reported his supervisor's comments. Plaintiff further argues that similarly situated employees were allowed to retain their jobs despite repeated indiscretions and that Defendant's stated reasons for the firing are a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only where it is shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the record as a whole could not lead a rational fact-finder to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and resolve all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of pointing to that part of the record which shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993), If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id. To meet this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and "come forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Florida Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991). If the evidence relied on is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment. Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919. A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient, however, to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is proper. Id. at 249-50,

B. Title VII

1. Discrimination

The Supreme Court has established a three-part, burden-shifting analysis for discrimination claims brought under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected class, that he was qualified for a position, that he suffered an adverse job action, and that similarly situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably. Id.; Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003): Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555. 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997).

If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it based its actions on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-3. The defendant may cite "a good reason, a bad reason, [or] a reason based on erroneous facts . . . as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason." Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden reverts to the Plaintiff to show that the defendant's stated non-discriminatory reasons are a mere pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff may meet this burden by producing evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons are false or that discrimination did indeed play a role in the decision-making process. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).

2. Hostile Work Environment

An employer may be held vicariously liable under Title VII when a supervisor subjects an employee to a hostile work environment. Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000). However, when an employer implements an anti-harassment policy, and employees are made aware of that policy, the employer is not liable when a plaintiff failed to put the employer on notice of the offensive conduct. Id. at 1300. The existence of a comprehensive policy satisfies an employer's obligation to monitor the workplace and obligates employees to utilize the procedures set forth in the policy and come forward with details of the supervisor's conduct. Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe, 115 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997).

3. Retaliation

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII by showing that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997). In order for a causal connection to exist, the defendant must have been aware of the plaintiff's statutorily protected activity at the time the adverse employment action occurred. Id. at 1197.

4. Chapter 11A of the Dade County Code

Chapter 11A of the Dade County Code expressly prohibits claims that name Metropolitan Dade County as a defendant, stating that Chapter 11A "shall not apply to any complaint naming Metropolitan Dade County . . . or any of [its] agencies or employees as a respondent" Dade County Code, § 11A-12)(a).

A. Plaintiff's discrimination claims fail because Plaintiff has not shown that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that Defendant's proffered rationale for its actions was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Plaintiff has established that he is a member of a protected class and that he suffered adverse job actions when Defendant dismissed him from one position and then terminated him from another. However, Plaintiff has not established that similarly situated employees were treated differently. Plaintiff claims that Defendant declined to terminate either a woman whose work was the subject of complaints or a married couple who worked in the same unit. Even if these employees committed indiscretions, they did not commit the same indiscretions as Plaintiff, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff refused to perform assigned work, left work without authorization, lost his temper in the workplace and shouted at his supervisors. Plaintiff has not alleged that any other employee behaved similarly yet remained employed. Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendant has put forward legitimate non-discriminatory reasons to explain its actions. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant dismissed Plaintiff from his first position as part of a county-wide layoff. Moreover, Defendant rehired Plaintiff for another position and did not terminate him from that position until Plaintiff behaved in an insubordinate manner during a series of events. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendant's stated reasons for his termination are a pretext for unlawful discrimination, and Plaintiff has acknowledged that none of the people involved in the decision to fire him ever engaged in racially discriminatory behavior against him. Even if, as Plaintiff alleges, Defendant based its decision to fire Plaintiff on misinterpretations of Plaintiff's behavior, Defendant may not be held liable for discrimination merely because it failed to fire Plaintiff for a good reason. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant's stated reasons for firing him were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

B. Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims fail because Plaintiff did not place Defendant on notice of his supervisor's actions until after his termination.

Plaintiff received a copy of Defendant's unlawful harassment policy and signed an acknowledgment of receipt on March 9, 2001. Defendant thus satisfied its obligation to monitor Plaintiff's work environment, and Plaintiff became responsible for reporting harassment in accordance with Defendant's policy. However, despite Plaintiff's allegation of a hostile work environment that persisted for weeks prior to his termination, Plaintiff never took action under Defendant's policy until the day before his dismissal. Plaintiff thus failed to place Defendant on notice of his hostile work environment until it was too late for Defendant to investigate and, if warranted, correct it.

C. Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because no causal connection existed between his statutorily protected activity and his termination.

Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity when he filed a report on August 30, 2001 that documented the racial slurs his supervisor had directed at him. Moreover, Plaintiff suffered an adverse job action when he was terminated the next day. However, there was no causal connection between the two incidents since the decision to fire Plaintiff was made prior to any knowledge of Plaintiff's protected activity. Defendant fired Plaintiff because of a series of incidents, all of which took place prior to Plaintiff's filing of his report. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

D. Plaintiff's local law claims fail because Chapter 11A of the Miami-Dade County Code does not permit this suit.

Because Plaintiff's Complaint names Miami-Dade County as Defendant, Plaintiff may not file any part of this suit under Chapter 11A of the Dade County Code.

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record and the Court being otherwise fully advised, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 and the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment for Defendant, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Miami-Dade County, and against Plaintiff Herve Gaston. The case, namely the entire Complaint, is dismissed with prejudice. This case is CLOSED. If applicable, this Court retains jurisdiction of the above-styled action to determine fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Defendant in defending this action. It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that any pending motions are DENIED as moot.

DONE and ORDERED in chambers at the James Lawrence King Federal Justice Building and United States Courthouse, Miami, Florida, this 6th day of November, 2003.