DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the cross application is denied, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action insofar as asserted against the remaining defendants is severed.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the amended complaint and the documents submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss failed to set forth a legally cognizable cause of action based on an oral partnership/joint venture agreement ( see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83; Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633). Viewing the facts as alleged in the record as true, and affording the plaintiff every favorable inference, the plaintiff failed to plead a mutual promise or undertaking to share the burden of the losses of the alleged enterprise, an indispensable element of a partnership or joint venture ( see Matter of Steinbeck v. Gerosa, 4 N.Y.2d 302, 317; Goodstein Props. v. Rego, 266 A.D.2d 506, 507; Davella v. Nielsen, 208 A.D.2d 494). Thus, the motion to dismiss the amended complaint should have been granted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's cross application for leave to replead pursuant to CPLR 3211(e) as he did not set forth "good ground" to support his cause of action ( Mehlman v. Gold, 183 A.D.2d 634, 635).
Furthermore, inasmuch as the plaintiff did not assert a breach of contract cause of action, we have no occasion to consider the defendant's arguments with respect thereto.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
SMITH, J.P., KRAUSMAN, McGINITY and RIVERA, JJ., concur.