DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The trial court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the eight-year-old complainant to testify as a sworn witness, as she understood the difference between truth and falsity, the legal and moral consequences of lying, and the importance of telling the truth at the proceeding ( see Matter of James B., 262 A.D.2d 480; Matter of Joseph C., 185 A.D.2d 883; cf. CPL 60.20). Furthermore, a trial court's determination with respect to a witness's competency will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous ( see People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560; Matter of Joseph C., supra; People v. Schultz, 168 A.D.2d 468).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of Darnell S., 300 A.D.2d 666; cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the fact-finding order. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses ( see Matter of Stevenson J., 306 A.D.2d 412; cf. People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84). Its determination should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( cf. People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence ( cf. CPL 470.15).
SANTUCCI, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.