SHIRA SCHEINDLIN, District Judge
Counsel for the two class members who objected to the fee request made by Lead Counsel, Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossman, LLP, are now seeking attorneys' fees of their own. Douglas A. Cole, who represented objector Charles Klein, and Nicholas M. Fausto, who represented objector Ronald A. Kline, seek $43,600 and $46,511.70 in fees respectively. For the following reasons, objectors' counsel will be awarded fees, although not in the amounts requested.
It is well settled that objectors have a valuable and important role to perform in policing class action settlements. See White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974). Accordingly, "they are entitled to an allowance as compensation for attorneys' fees and expenses where a proper showing has been made that the settlement was improved as a result of their efforts." Id. Furthermore, "the trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether, and in what amount, attorneys' fees should be awarded, since [s]he is in the best position to determine whether the participation of objectors assisted the court and enhanced the recovery." Id.
Although this Court would likely have reached the same result, with or without the objectors' comments, some of the viewpoints and facts highlighted by the objectors certainly assisted the Court in making an appropriate fee award. Because the overall settlement was improved by their efforts, objectors' counsel are entitled to an award of fees.
When granting fee awards, district courts are given broad discretion in determining what is reasonable under the circumstances. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). See also Community Television Sys., Inc. v. Caruso, 284 F.3d 430, 437 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Our review of an award of attorneys' fees is highly deferential to the district court; we will reverse on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Ordinarily the trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether, and in what amount, attorneys' fees should be awarded, since [s]he is in the best position to determine whether the participation of objectors assisted the court and enhanced the recovery." White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974).
Courts typically use one of two methods to determine a reasonable attorneys' fee: (1) the percentage of recovery method or (2) the lodestar method. See Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2000). Whether calculated using the lodestar or the percentage method, the fees awarded in common fund cases may not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances. See Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1988). Under the lodestar method, the district court "scrutinizes the fee petition to ascertain the number of hours reasonably billed and then multiplies that figure by an appropriate hourly rate." Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 47 (citing Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 166 F.3d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Douglas Cole submitted a detailed billing summary for the work he performed. That summary contained the following entries: 13.0 hours for Review of Court Documents; 13.0 hours for Court Appearance Prep; 19.0 hours for Writing Briefs and Other Material; 10.75 hours for Phone Calls, Letter Conferences; and 19.0 hours for Legal Research. Multiplying the total hours of 74.75 by Cole's hourly rate of $375 per hour yields a lodestar figure of $28,031.25. Cole, however, requests that his lodestar figure be multiplied by approximately 1.55 based on the benefit afforded the class. Finally, Cole seeks reimbursement of $200 in expenses.
Nicholas Fausto did not provide a detailed summary of his work. In his Affidavit, Fausto merely states that he expended 81.5 hours on this matter and then describes the broad categories of work he performed, e.g., "file review of research results and potential objections" and "drafting of objections to class action settlement." At Fausto's billing rate of $375 per hour, his lodestar figure amounts to $30,562.50. However, the total amount requested by Fausto is $46,511.70. This difference may be attributable to an unexpressed multiplier but it is irrelevant in any event as no multipliers are warranted.
If a district court concludes that any expenditure of time is unreasonable, it must exclude those hours from the lodestar calculation. See Luciano, 109 F.3d at 116. "[A] district court can exclude excessive and unreasonable hours from its fee computation by making an across-the-board reduction in the amount of hours." Id. at 117. (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that "the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts in hours `as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.'") (quoting New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving a percentage reduction of total fee award to account for vagueness in documentation of certain time entries).
I find that a 50% reduction in Fausto's lodestar figure is warranted as well as a 33% reduction in Cole's lodestar figure. It is difficult to fathom how counsel spent 74.75 and 81.5 hours preparing their objections. Both objections were fairly boilerplate and routine. Moreover, this was not the first time these counsel have appeared for objectors and raised nearly identical objections. While I do not mean to detract from the value of what each counsel contributed, I do conclude that their fee requests are excessive given the results they achieved. Accordingly, Cole's fee award is $18,887.50, which represents 2/3 of his lodestar figure of $28,031.25 plus $200 in expenses. Fausto's fee award is half of $30,562.50, plus $425 in expenses, which totals to $15,706.25.
For unexplained reasons, Fausto did not seek reimbursement of these expenses in his moving papers. However, attorneys may be compensated for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to their clients, as long as they ""were incidental and necessary" to the representation of those clients. Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given the reduction in counsel's lodestar figure, reimbursement of his modest expenses is warranted even if not requested.