VASINGTON, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Both parties appeared and were represented by counsel. All statutory stays having expired, the court has jurisdiction.
Having heard the evidence, the court finds as follows:
The defendant and the plaintiff, whose maiden name was Leitkowski, intermarried at New London, Connecticut on June 13, 1980; that the plaintiff has resided continuously in Connecticut for a period of one year next preceding the date of the filing of this complaint; that there are no minor children issue of the marriage; that there were no other minor children born to the plaintiff since the date of the marriage of the parties; that the marriage has broken down irretrievably; that there is no hope of reconciliation and that no state agency is presently contributing to the care or welfare of the parties.
The plaintiff testified that the breakdown of the marriage was caused by the defendant's infidelity; that he used verbally abusive language to her in public; that he was argumentative and that he called her a blank'n blank.
She testified that she and the defendant had no sexual activity with each other for two years; that he claimed it was because his back hurt; that he seldom came home early; that on numerous occasions he was not on the job sites as he claimed; that he always spoke of his ex-wife, Barbara; that she suspected that he was seeing his ex-wife and having an affair with her; that one night, after he returned home from work, he left unshaven and in his work clothes telling the plaintiff that he was going to look for deer; that after he left, she drove to where the ex-wife lived and saw the defendant's truck parked on her property; that she waited an hour and when the defendant did not come out, she went to CT Page 13378 his truck, took the keys to the truck and returned home; that about four hours later, the defendant appeared clean shaven; that in August 2002 she told him to leave the marital residence as she would not stand for infidelity as she had previously told him.
The defendant testified the plaintiff called him stupid; that he was only verbally abusive to the plaintiff in their home; that he did not have any extramarital affairs during his marriage to the plaintiff; that he was at his ex-wife's home, the night the plaintiff saw him, to inquire about her mother; that she invited him in for some coffee; that he returned home in his work clothes as he had when he left his home; that in his deposition (Plaintiff's Exhibit F), he testified that the breakdown of the marriage was because plaintiff and defendant had lost interest in each other. However, he testified that he didn't want a divorce as he still has feelings for the plaintiff and admitted that the plaintiff and he were equally at fault for the breakdown of their marriage.
Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably with no hope for reconciliation. I find the defendant more at fault for the breakdown of the marriage than the plaintiff.
The defendant, who was born September 12, 1939, was one month short of obtaining his high school diploma. At the time of his marriage, the defendant owned Morgan Foundation Co., which he acquired for $10,000.00 prior to his marriage. After his marriage to the plaintiff the company's name was changed to TL Morgan Foundation since the plaintiff became involved in the company.
The plaintiff who is 51 years of age, has a high school diploma from Montville High School. In 1991, the plaintiff had a hysterectomy for pre-cancer and has a bladder problem. Both conditions require periodic checks. She further has a lower back disc problem which resulted from her engagement in the concrete business as set forth hereinafter.
The plaintiff, who was employed at Electric Boat at the time of her marriage in 1980, left said employment and went into the defendant's business. The defendant trained the plaintiff in the concrete work of the business. Since 1980 that has been plaintiff's profession and source of income. However, she is no longer interested in operating said business and is willing to transfer it to the defendant.
In August 2002, as stated aforesaid, the defendant left the marital home and has not been involved at TL Morgan Foundation although the CT Page 13379 plaintiff testified that he was welcome to continue in the business. He has not received any monies from said business since then. From mid-November 2002, he worked for the plaintiffs brother, who owns a construction company. He works about 20-25 hours per week for free rent, use of a car and free gas and about $30 per week. He also receives a Social Security payment of $1,000.00 per month which provides him with about $228.00 per week.
The defendant testified that he could run the business and provide more income from the business than the plaintiff is receiving. He valued the business and its equipment at $100,000.00.
On October 2002 the name of TL Morgan Foundation, Inc., was changed to Morgan-Williams Concrete. The plaintiff and David Williams operated the new company so as to award workers' compensation liability.
In a prior dissolution in 1980, plaintiff acquired title to real estate located on Cape Ann Road in New London, Connecticut, which was subject to a $36,000.00 mortgage. No evidence was offered as to the market value of the Cape Ann Road property when the plaintiff acquired said property and/or on June 13, 1980 when the parties married. At the time of her marriage to the defendant, the plaintiff, her three children of a prior marriage and the defendant lived in said property and remained there for about 15 years.
The defendant claims he did extensive work on the Cape Ann Road property. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) However, no amount expended or value was placed on said work by the defendant. The plaintiff denied defendant's claim, but admitted they jointly put in sidewalks.
In 1992 the plaintiff purchased 474 Route 161, Montville, Connecticut from her father. He had owned it for 46 years. He valued it at $200,000.00 although he sold it to the plaintiff for $110,000.00. He further claimed a gift to the plaintiff of the $90,000.00 difference between his value and the sale price. In 1990-1991 the Town of Montville assessor valued the property at $119,000 and assessed it for tax purposes at $83,720. (See Defendant's Exhibit 3.) No other evidence was presented as to the value of said property at the time of sale. The parties, however, by stipulation dated November 13, 2003, agreed that the market value at said time when acquired by the plaintiff from her father was $145,000.00.
The plaintiff paid her father $2,500 and issued a mortgage to him for the balance of the purchase price. The $2,500 for the deposit was from joint funds of the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant was not a CT Page 13380 participant in the acquisition of said property.
At the time of the sale, the property consisted of five acres, more or less, a dwelling house and a garage. Since the property was purchased, a 26 x 40 addition, a pool and a 3/4 acre pond was constructed on said property. Real estate appraisers have assessed present market values of said property at $270,000.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) and $285,000.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 1.)
The defendant claims he did much of the work for the improvement at 464 Rte. 161, Montville. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit C.) Again, plaintiff denies the defendant's claim. She testified that they hired Hamel Construction to do the work and paid it by check and trading concrete work from a business the parties were engaged in. She further testified that she put in the pool, not the defendant, and that the 3/4 acre pond was put in by her brother whom she paid.
During their marriage the mortgage payments due on both properties and expenses of the parties were paid from funds of TL Morgan Foundation, Inc. Plaintiff continued to pay her bills from proceeds said business continued to receive from its operations.
Subsequent to the purchase of the 474 Route 161 property from her father, the plaintiff sold the Cape Am Road property in 1995 for $110,0000 and received net proceeds of $76,046.23 (Plaintiff's Exhibit G.) In 1995 she paid her father $74,500.00 more or less from said proceeds.
In 1997-1998, the defendant with four other persons purchased real estate on Pember Road, Waterford, Connecticut. The defendant owns a 1/4 share and paid $15,000 for same. (See Defendant's Exhibit 2.) The property has not increased in value but the defendant feels his interest may be worth more if Route 11, which may run though the property, is completed.
In January 2003 the plaintiff refinanced the 474 Route 161 property for $66,000.00 contrary to the automatic court orders in this case. There is a mortgage balance of around $63,000.00.
A portion of mortgage refinance proceeds were used to pay the Internal Revenue Service $25,000.00 for taxes owed for the parties' business and $10,000.00 for the balance on plaintiff's Volkswagen. The plaintiff's attorney now holds $30,000.00 in escrow subject to orders of this court. In addition, the business owed $22,000.00 to the State of Connecticut for workers' compensation. The plaintiff paid around $16,000.00 on said CT Page 13381 account. A balance of $6,800.00 remains unpaid.
The plaintiff sold 55 to 60 guns he owned, contrary to the automatic court orders restricting said sale. He received around $15,000.00 for said guns and has approximately $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 left. He used the money to pay his attorney and for living expenses.
The disposition of remaining assets and liabilities of the parties will be set forth in the orders entered hereafter.
After considering all the evidence, the provisions of the pertinent statutes and the proposed orders submitted by both parties, judgment is entered dissolving the marriage of the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown without any hope for reconciliation. It is further ordered that:
1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per week periodic alimony until the first of the occurrence of the following events: (1) her remarriage, (2) death of either party, (3) cohabitation with an unrelated male pursuant to the Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-86b or (4) January 15, 2009. Said alimony is modifiable as to amount, but not modifiable as to term. Further, said alimony order shall commence on January 15, 2004 which gives the defendant an opportunity to produce income from the concrete business he will receive.
2. The plaintiff shall transfer to the defendant all of her right, title and interest in and to the business now known as Morgan-Williams Concrete together with all equipment and trucks used in said business plus all bank accounts of said business and all debts of said business. The defendant shall pay and hold the plaintiff harmless on all of said debts.
3. The monies held in escrow by plaintiff's attorney shall be paid to the plaintiff, free of any claim by the defendant.
4. The plaintiff shall have all right, title and interest in and to the marital residence known as 474 Route 161, Montville, Connecticut together with the furnishings and personal property therein, free of any claim by the defendant, but subject to all CT Page 13382 mortgages and liens on said property. The plaintiff shall pay and hold the defendant harmless on all mortgages and encumbrances on said premises.
5. The defendant shall have all right, title and interest in and to the land on Pember Road, Waterford, Connecticut, free of any claim by the plaintiff.
6. The plaintiff shall keep the 1998 Volkswagen Beetle, free and clear of any claim from the defendant.
7. The defendant shall keep the 1997 Ford truck, free and clear of any claim from the plaintiff.
8. The plaintiff shall keep her People's Bank checking account, her CSEA State Credit Union account and her Connecticut State Police Credit Union account and her insurance policy, free and clear of any claim of the defendant.
9. The defendant shall keep the 1993 Dodge truck, the 1987 Suzuki, his gun collection and all monies received therefrom and his personal property left in the marital residence, free and clear of any claim from the plaintiff.
10. The plaintiff shall be responsible for the debts listed on her financial affidavit dated August 19, 2003 except those of the Morgan Williams Concrete business and/or its predecessors, which debts are ordered paid by the defendant pursuant to paragraph 2 above. CT Page 13383
11. The defendant shall be responsible for all his own debts listed on his financial affidavit dated August 19, 2003 and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
12. Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees.
13. The plaintiff's maiden name, Leitkowski, is hereby restored.
VASINGTON, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE. CT Page 13384