Before accepting defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, the court thoroughly warned him of the risks and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, advised him of the importance of being represented by an attorney, and ascertained that his waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101; People v. Providence, 308 A.D.2d 200). Defendant had been found competent after a CPL article 730 examination, and he does not challenge that determination. Accordingly, defendant's psychiatric condition would not disqualify him from exercising his right of self-representation, because there is a single standard of competency to stand trial and to waive the right to counsel (Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389; People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351;People v. Schoolfield, 196 A.D.2d 111, 116-118, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 915).
The record does not support defendant's assertion that the court improperly revoked defendant's pro se status after the trial. On the contrary, the record reveals that defendant's standby counsel's participation in a presentence conference and at sentencing was entirely at defendant's request and with his approval.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.
We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.