DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
New York recognizes claims to recover damages for emotional distress ( see Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21). However, a plaintiff must produce evidence which is sufficient to guarantee the genuineness of the claim ( see Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-384). To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for emotional distress following exposure to a toxic substance, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was in fact exposed to a disease-causing agent and that there is a "rational basis" for his or her fear of contracting a disease ( see Prato v. Vigliotta, 253 A.D.2d 746, 748; Abusio v. Consolidated Edison Co.of N.Y., 238 A.D.2d 454; Wolff v. A-One Oil, 216 A.D.2d 291, 292). This court has construed "rational basis" to mean "the clinically-demonstrable presence of a toxin in the plaintiff's body, or some other indication of a toxin-induced disease" ( Prato v. Vigliotta, supra; see e.g. Abusio v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., supra).
In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, although the plaintiff established that the infant plaintiff was exposed to volatile organic compounds (hereinafter VOC), she presented neither clinical evidence of some physical manifestation of VOC contamination ( see Prato v. Vigliotta, supra), nor evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact regarding some other indication of a toxin-induced disease ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a "rational basis" for the infant plaintiff's fear of developing a disease.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
S. MILLER, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, ADAMS and CRANE, JJ., concur.