On this record, there was sufficient question as to the nature of the unseen object so that the court should have granted defendant's request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15). "A defendant is entitled to a charge on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree when there is presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the defense are satisfied, i.e., that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury" ( People v. Gilliard, 72 N.Y.2d 877, 878). Under the circumstances of the case, reduction of the conviction to robbery in the second degree with a remand for resentencing would provide an appropriate remedy for the charging error ( see e.g. People v. Jones, 305 A.D.2d 264, 266).
There is no merit to defendant's argument that the conviction should be reduced to robbery in the third degree.
The record fails to support defendant's claim that he was absent during discussions concerning jurors during deliberations ( see People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44. In any event, the discussions were merely ministerial, and thus defendant's presence was not required ( see People v. Hameed, 88 N.Y.2d 232, 240-242). Nothing in the court's colloquy amounted to a legal instruction of any kind.
In view of our affirmance, as modified, of defendant's conviction, there is no basis for reversal of the order denying habeas corpus relief.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.