DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925; People v. Hawkins-Rusch, 212 A.D.2d 961). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
Since the evidence of the defendant's guilt was not entirely circumstantial ( see People v. Guidice, 83 N.Y.2d 630, 636; People v. Rumble, 45 N.Y.2d 879), the trial court properly refused to give a circumstantial evidence charge ( see People v. Guidice, supra at 636; People v. Daddona, 81 N.Y.2d 990, 992).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the prosecutor did not advocate a position that she knew to be false ( cf. People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97). Moreover, the defendant's contention that the prosecutor breached her duty to correct testimony that she knew to be mistaken or false ( see People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1; People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 556) is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05), and in any event, is without merit.
The defendant's remaining contentions either are unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05), or without merit.
ALTMAN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, ADAMS and TOWNES, JJ., concur.