DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion which were to set aside the verdict as legally insufficient and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Victor Ho are granted.
It is well settled that the requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice case are a departure from accepted practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of the injury ( see Biggs v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., 303 A.D.2d 702; Roseingrave v. Massapequa Gen. Hosp., 298 A.D.2d 377; Barracca v. St. Francis Hosp., 237 A.D.2d 396). It is the plaintiff's "burden to show that the defendant's conduct was a substantial causative factor in the sequence of events that led to [the plaintiff's] injury" ( Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 520; see Marren v. State of New York, 142 A.D.2d 717). The test is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and affording him the benefit of every favorable inference, there was any rational basis on which the jury could have found for the plaintiff ( see Biggs v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., supra at 703).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and affording them the benefit of every favorable inference, we find that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case against the defendant Dr. Victor Ho. Assuming that the jury accepted the plaintiffs' evidence that Dr. Ho's treatment of the plaintiff Gerald Abram departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice, there was no rational basis on which the jury could have found for the plaintiffs on the issue of proximate cause ( see Biggs v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of Dr. Ho's motion which were to set aside the verdict as legally insufficient and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
RITTER, J.P., S. MILLER, LUCIANO and TOWNES, JJ., concur.