Cardona, P.J.
A zoning ordinance enacted by respondent Town of Edmeston, Otsego County, prohibits the installation of mobile homes on property located in its "R-HD Residential Hamlet District." Respondents Darryl Barton and Kim Barton (hereinafter collectively referred to as respondents), owners of real property in that district, applied for a land use variance to install a mobile home. The Town's Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter ZBA) granted the variance. Petitioners, the owners of property neighboring the parcel owned by respondents, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against the Town and respondents challenging the variance claiming that the presence of mobile homes would depreciate property values. The Town did not answer the petition. In their motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f), respondents raised the objections that, inter alia, petitioners lacked standing to challenge the variance and the petition should be dismissed due to petitioners' failure to name the ZBA as a necessary party. In response, petitioners, inter alia, urged denial of the motion or, alternatively, permission to amend their complaint to include the ZBA as a party. Supreme Court denied respondents' motion, prompting this appeal.
Initially, we find that Supreme Court was correct in finding that petitioners have standing to challenge the issuance of the variance. Notably, "standing principles are broadly construed in matters involving zoning [litigation]" (Matter of Gallahan v. Planning Bd. of City of Ithaca, 307 A.D.2d 684, 685, lv denied ___ N.Y.2d ___ [Nov. 20, 2003]; see Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 413). However, it is also true that a party challenging a zoning determination where a land use has been changed must still establish standing by showing that they are aggrieved in a way different from the public at large. That may be presumptively established by a showing of close proximity to the subject property (see Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, supra at 413; Matter of O'Donnell v. Town of Schoharie, 291 A.D.2d 739, 740; Matter of Manupella v. Troy City Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 272 A.D.2d 761, 762).
Here, respondents allege that petitioners have failed to establish by competent proof that their property is located in the immediate vicinity of respondents' land (see Matter of Piela v. Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94). While the language in the petition is not expansive, the map and other information in the record adequately establish that petitioners live on the same street as the subject property, with the closest living two houses down and across the street and the farthest a block away. Since the information provided was sufficient for Supreme Court to determine the actual location of petitioners' properties in relation to that of respondents (see id. at 96), we find no reason to disturb the court's ruling as to standing.
However, with respect to respondents' claim that petitioners failed to name a necessary party, we come to a different conclusion. It is undisputed that the actual basis of petitioners' claim is their challenge to the ZBA's issuance of the variance, an action that only the ZBA, not the Town, is empowered to perform. It is well established that "a court may not adjudicate a dispute raised in a CPLR article 78 proceeding unless the governmental agency which performed the challenged action is a party thereto" (Matter of McNeill v. Town Bd. of Town of Ithaca, 260 A.D.2d 829, 830, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 812; see Matter of Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin, 62 N.Y.2d 260, 265; Matter of Cuyle v. Town Bd. of Town of Oxford, 301 A.D.2d 838, 840, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 501). Accordingly, the ZBA was a necessary party to this proceeding (see Matter of McCartney v. Incorporated Vil. of E. Williston, 149 A.D.2d 597; Phillips v. Village of Oriskany, 57 A.D.2d 110; cf. Matter of McNeill v. Town Board of Town of Ithaca, supra; Matter of Watt v. Town of Gaines, 140 A.D.2d 947,appeal dismissed, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 1040; see generally Matter of Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin, supra).
Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by petitioners' invocation of the "relation back" doctrine (see CPLR 203 [b]) as a means of avoiding dismissal for failure to join a necessary party. Any claim that the Town and the ZBA are "united in interest" is defeated by the difference in powers and functions of the two (see Matter of Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin,supra), as well as the documentary evidence submitted herein. Specifically, petitioners' proof confirms that the Town enacted a zoning ordinance forbidding mobile homes in the subject district (the exact requirement that petitioners seek to enforce) and only the ZBA was empowered to issue a variance therefrom. Significantly, the relation back test requires, among other things, proof that "`both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence'" (L L Plumbing Heating v. De Palo, 253 A.D.2d 517, 517, quoting Mondello v. New York Blood Ctr. — Greater N.Y. Blood Program, 80 N.Y.2d 219, 226 [emphasis added]) and, here, petitioner had no claim against the Town at all. Moreover, the Town and the ZBA cannot be considered to be united in interest since they do not stand or fall together and a judgment concerning the variance will not similarly affect both entities (see L L Plumbing Heating v. De Palo, supra at 518). Thus, we cannot assume that the Town and the ZBA had the same interest in defending the variance (see Matter of Chalian v. Malone, 307 A.D.2d 619, 621) and any claim of identical interests is further undermined by the Town's default in this proceeding. Since the statute of limitations has already run, the ZBA cannot be joined as a party (see Matter of Manupella v. Troy City Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 272 A.D.2d 761, 763, supra) and this proceeding must be dismissed.
Consideration of the remaining arguments raised by the parties has been rendered unnecessary due to resolution of the foregoing issues.
Spain and Kane, JJ., concur.