DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court should have charged the jury with certain provisions of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter the Building Code) which were in effect in 1938, is unpreserved for appellate review ( see Frumusa v. Weyer Constr., 245 A.D.2d 416, 417; Saleh v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 119 A.D.2d 652, 653; Rossetti v. Campanella, 118 A.D.2d 552, 553). In any event, the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient proof to establish when the subject stairway was constructed. Thus, she failed to establish the applicability of different versions of the Building Code ( see Sparrock v. City of New York, 219 A.D.2d 705, 706; Ross v. Manhattan Chelsea Assocs., 194 A.D.2d 332, 333; Montoya v. Vasquez, 185 A.D.2d 875). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly declined to include any provisions of the Building Code in its charge to the jury.
In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's remaining contentions have been rendered academic.
RITTER, J.P., SMITH, H. MILLER and MASTRO, JJ., concur.