MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this negligence action to recover damages for injuries sustained by Judith M. Skowronski (plaintiff) when the vehicle she was driving collided with a vehicle owned by defendant Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford) and operated by defendant Vincent Mordino.
On appeal from a judgment entered following a jury verdict of no cause of action, plaintiffs contend that the jury finding that Mordino was negligent but that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence. Although Ford is correct that plaintiffs failed to preserve for our review their contention that the verdict is inconsistent by failing to raise that contention before the jury was discharged ( see Barry v. Manglass, 55 N.Y.2d 803, 805-806, rearg denied 55 N.Y.2d 1039; Everding v. Bombard, 272 A.D.2d 937, 938), they have nevertheless preserved for our review their contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence by moving to set aside the verdict on that ground. Thus, "this is a distinction without a difference in this case" ( Lockhart v. Adirondack Tr. Lines, 305 A.D.2d 766, 767; see Simmons v. Dendis Constr., 270 A.D.2d 919, 920-921).
Turning to the merits, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. The well-established standard for determining such a motion is whether the evidence so preponderated in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Grassi v. Ulrich, 87 N.Y.2d 954, 956; Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746). "A jury finding that a party was negligent but that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues `are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause'" ( Cona v. Dwyer, 292 A.D.2d 562, 563, quoting Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 527). Further, "[w]here . . . `an apparently inconsistent or illogical verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view'" ( Mascia v. Olivia, 299 A.D.2d 883, 883, quoting Kovit v. Estate of Hallums, 261 A.D.2d 442, 443-444). Here, the jury could have reasonably found from the evidence that, although Mordino was negligent for not having seen the vehicle operated by plaintiff as she made a left turn onto the street where Mordino was "inching forward" from a stop sign but not yet in the intersection, such negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision between the two vehicles. Thus, "the finding of proximate cause did not inevitably flow from the finding of culpable conduct" ( Hernandez v. Baron, 248 A.D.2d 440, 440; see Schaefer v. Guddemi, 182 A.D.2d 808, 809; see also Inserro v. Rochester Drug Coop., 258 A.D.2d 923, 923-924).