DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's request at sentencing to relieve his third court-appointed attorney and determined that the defendant would have to represent himself ( see People v. Gloster, 175 A.D.2d 258, 260). Although an effective waiver of the right to counsel must be the product of a free and meaningful choice, a criminal defendant may be asked to choose between waiver and another course of action as long as the choice presented is not constitutionally offensive ( see Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278; People v. Robinson, 244 A.D.2d 364) . Here, the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he refused, without good cause, to cooperate with able appointed counsel ( see People v. Robinson, supra; People v. Gloster, supra).
The People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a second felony offender by producing a certificate of conviction, which identified the previously convicted individual by name and New York State Identification Number ( see CPL 60.60, 400.15[a]; People v. Melvin, 279 A.D.2d 481; People v. Richards, 266 A.D.2d 714, 715-716). The defendant's conclusory allegations were insufficient to support his contention that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained ( see People v. Owens, 272 A.D.2d 481; People v. Shepard, 268 A.D.2d 540). Thus, the defendant was properly sentenced as a second felony offender.
PRUDENTI, P.J., FLORIO, H. MILLER, SCHMIDT and COZIER, JJ., concur.