DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the sua sponte pre-voir dire excusal by the County Court of those prospective jurors who were uncertain of their ability to be fair is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05). In any event, this procedure was a proper exercise of the court's discretion ( see People v. Boozer, 298 A.D.2d 261; People v. Brown, 136 A.D.2d 1, appeal denied 72 N.Y.2d 827, cert denied 488 U.S. 897; People v. Gayle, 238 A.D.2d 133).
The County Court properly refused to charge the jury as to the defense of justification. A trial court must charge a jury on the defense of justification only "if on any reasonable view of the evidence, the fact finder might have decided that the defendant's actions were justified" ( People v. Cox, 92 N.Y.2d 1002, 1004; see People v. White, 305 A.D.2d 616; People v. Davis, 293 A.D.2d 486) . Where deadly physical force is used, the evidence must establish that the defendant reasonably believed that he or she was in imminent danger of being subjected to deadly physical force, and that he or she had satisfied his or her duty to retreat, or was under no such duty ( see People v. Powell, 181 A.D.2d 923). Here, there is no reasonable view of the evidence from which the finder of fact could have found that the defendant's actions were justified. By his own testimony, the defendant established that just before the victim was stabbed, the victim dropped the knife he allegedly possessed.
The defendant contends that there was insufficient proof of his identity as the person who stabbed the victim. However, viewing the evidence adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
Although the County Court improperly permitted the defendant to be cross-examined as to his pretrial alibi notice ( see People v. Brown, 98 N.Y.2d 226), this error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt ( see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230).
The defendant's remaining contentions with respect to the judgment of conviction rendered under Indictment No. 1337/98 either are unpreserved for appellate review or constitute harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
In view of our determination with respect to the defendant's judgment of conviction rendered under Indictment No. 1337/98, upon a jury verdict, there is no basis for vacatur of his plea of guilty under Indictment No. 1332B/98.
ALTMAN, J.P., COZIER, MASTRO and RIVERA, JJ., concur.