WELLS, J.
We have for review Department of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles v. Dobrin, 829 So.2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with our decision in Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1997). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
FACTS
The evidence presented in this case consists only of the necessary paperwork reported by the officer as a result of the traffic stop in this case. These documents reveal the following facts. An officer observed petitioner Martin Matthew Dobrin (Dobrin) driving his truck at a high rate of speed (estimated by the officer at fifty miles per hour) and drifting to the right and correcting himself in a quick manner on several occasions. The officer pulled Dobrin over and ticketed him for failure to maintain a single lane. During this procedure, the officer noticed that Dobrin's eyes were bloodshot and that his breath smelled of alcohol. The officer conducted a field sobriety test, which Dobrin failed. The officer then arrested Dobrin for driving under the influence (DUI), read Dobrin the implied consent warning, Dobrin refused to take a breath test, and as a result, respondent Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) suspended Dobrin's license.
At the formal administrative review of Dobrin's license suspension, Dobrin challenged the validity of the traffic stop, arguing that the officer failed to specify in his arrest report that Dobrin had actually gone beyond a single lane. Dobrin claimed that the failure to include this information in the arrest report indicated that the officer did not have probable cause for the traffic stop. The hearing officer rejected without elaboration Dobrin's argument in respect to the probable cause for the traffic stop, concluding that the officer did have probable cause to believe that Dobrin was driving under the influence, that Dobrin was lawfully arrested, and that Dobrin refused the breath test after being informed that refusal to submit to the breath test would result in license suspension. Thus, the hearing officer suspended Dobrin's license.
Dobrin thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court. The circuit court granted Dobrin's petition and quashed the hearing officer's order of license suspension, finding that the facts observed by the officer and contained in the officer's arrest report did not provide probable cause to stop Dobrin's vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane. The circuit court further rejected the Department's argument that the officer was justified in stopping Dobrin for speeding, reasoning that it could not uphold the stop on the basis of what the officer could have done. The arrest report did not provide that the officer initiated the traffic stop because Dobrin was speeding, nor did it provide what the speed limit was for that section of road on which Dobrin was traveling. Finally, the court rejected the Department's argument that the officer was justified in stopping Dobrin to determine whether he was ill, tired, or driving under the influence because the arrest report did not indicate that impairment was the reason for the stop. Dobrin v. Dep't of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles, No. 2001-32341-CICI (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 8, 2002).
The Department thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Fifth District granted the petition and quashed the circuit court's decision, providing as follows:
The reason given for the circuit trial court's action was that the arrest affidavit did not specifically allege that Dobrin crossed either line of the traffic lane and further failed to allege the posted speed limit of the street at the point where the officer observed the "fast" speed. The court refused to consider an alternative basis for the stop stating: "This court finds that it cannot uphold the stop on a basis of what the officer could have done, rather it must only analyze what in fact the officer did and why he did it." Here, the court applied the wrong law. The issue is not why this particular officer conducted the traffic stop; the question should be whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer under the same circumstances to make the stop.
See State v. Pollard,
625 So.2d 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993);
see also State v. McNeal,
666 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In other words, would it be unreasonable for an officer who observed one driving a truck at a high rate of speed and unable to maintain a straight course to pull a driver over to check the safety of the vehicle, the health of the driver or the capacity of the driver?
Because we believe the court below applied the wrong law, we grant certiorari and quash the circuit trial court's order quashing the suspension.
Dep't of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles v. Dobrin, 829 So.2d 922, 922-23 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
We granted review on the basis of conflict with our decision inHolland v. State, 696 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1997). For the following reasons, we quash the Fifth District's decision in this case and reinstate the circuit court's order.
ANALYSIS
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures includes investigatory stops of automobiles. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). An examination of the validity of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment thus requires courts to determine whether the stop was reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual, subjective motivations of the individual officers involved in conducting the stop. The only concern under the Fourth Amendment is the validity of the basis asserted by the officer involved in the stop. The Court thus rejected a consideration of whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have initiated the traffic stop, noting that it seems "easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a `reasonable officer' would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation." Id. at 815.
In Holland, this Court adopted the objective test as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Whren. We found this to be required by article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. We further held that, when applying the objective test, the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question. Holland, 696 So.2d at 759. In so holding, we receded from our decision inState v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1995), in which we rejected a strict objective test in favor of the reasonable officer test. In Daniel, we had characterized the reasonable officer test as "whether the usual police practice would be to effect a stop when confronted with a particular kind of minor infraction." Id. at 1043. This was also the test applied by the Second District in Pollard and McNeal, the cases relied upon by the Fifth District in the instant case. See State v. Pollard, 625 So.2d 968, 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (relying on reasonable officer test as set forth in Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1988), which was upheld by this Court inDaniel)); State v. McNeal, 666 So.2d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (applying reasonable officer test and considering whether usual police practice would be to effect a stop when confronted with the traffic infraction).
As amended in 1982, section 12 provides that "[t]his right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."
By considering whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have pulled Dobrin over, the Fifth District in this case applied a principle of law that is no longer applicable. The correct test to be applied under the circumstances of this case is whether the particular officer who initiated the traffic stop had an objectively reasonable basis for making the stop. We reinstate the circuit court's order because the circuit court applied the correct law.
On certiorari review, the circuit court was charged with the duty of determining whether competent, substantial evidence existed to support the traffic stop in this case. See Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1989); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1982). The only record evidence from which to make this determination was the paperwork that the officer filed as a result of this traffic stop. From this limited evidence, the circuit court concluded that (1) the record did not competently or substantially support the officer's stop of Dobrin's vehicle on the basis of the failure to maintain a single lane because the facts contained in the arrest report did not provide probable cause that this traffic infraction actually occurred; (2) the record did not competently or substantially support the officer's stop of Dobrin's vehicle on the basis of speeding because there was no indication in the record that Dobrin was in fact speeding; and (3) the record did not competently or substantially support the officer's stop of Dobrin's vehicle to determine whether Dobrin was ill, tired, or driving under the influence because the record did not indicate that Dobrin was impaired. The court recognized that it could not speculate from the record facts that were not contained in it, and the documentary evidence did not provide probable cause for the stop.
As the United States Supreme Court held in Whren, the validity of a traffic stop is determined by considering whether the officer who stopped the vehicle had probable cause to do so, not whether it would be standard police practice to stop the vehicle. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 814. The circuit court in this case applied the correct law by considering whether the particular officer in this case had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.
Accordingly, we quash the district court's decision in this case. Because the circuit court applied the proper test underHolland in reviewing the administrative agency's decision, we reinstate the circuit court's order quashing Dobrin's license suspension.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., concur.
CANTERO, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANTERO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the district court, by failing to apply Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1997), applied the wrong law. Unlike the majority, however, I believe that the circuit court, too, applied the wrong law. I would remand to the district court to reconsider the case in light of Holland.
Our decision in Holland applied the then-recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the motivations of the individual officers involved. Instead, the Court applied a simple objective test based on the common law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure. Id. at 813, 819. The question is not what the officer did and why he did it, or even what a "reasonable officer" would have done. As we stated in Holland, applying Whren, "When applying the objective test, generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question." 696 So.2d at 759.
The majority is correct that the district court in this case failed to apply that standard. Instead, it analyzed "whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer under the same circumstances to make the stop." Dep't of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles v. Dobrin, 829 So.2d 922, 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). This Court articulated the reasonable officer standard in 1995, before the Supreme Court decided Whren. See State v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040, 1046 (Fla. 1995). In Holland, we acknowledged that Whren rejected that standard in favor of a strict objective test.
Nevertheless, at least the district court attempted to apply some type of objective test, and I am not sure the test it applied differs much from the strict objective test. Whether a reasonable officer under the same circumstances would make the stop is not much different from whether probable cause existed for the stop: by definition, a reasonable officer would only stop a vehicle when probable cause exists. I can envision no circumstances where the result will depend on which objective test is used.
On the other hand, the circuit court rejected an objective test altogether. As the district court noted, the circuit court used a much different analysis. As quoted in the district court's opinion, it stated the issue as follows: "This court finds that it cannot uphold the stop on a basis of what the officer could have done, rather it must only analyze what in fact the officer did and why he did it." 829 So.2d at 922 (emphasis added). This is a subjective test.
Moreover, the circuit court's order repeatedly limits its consideration of the justification for the stop to the clipped statements in the arrest report, without considering the other, apparently uncontradicted, circumstances of the stop. For example, even though the officer issued Dobrin a citation for failure to maintain a single lane — obvious evidence that the officer observed Dobrin failing to maintain a single lane — the circuit court refused to consider that infraction as justification for the stop because the arrest report itself stated only that the vehicle drifted to the right and corrected itself in a quick manner. The circuit court also refused to consider Dobrin's erratic driving pattern as justification for the stop because the arrest report did not state that the officer thought impairment was a reason for the stop. Finally, the circuit court refused to consider Dobrin's speeding as justification for the stop because the arrest report does not mention it as a reason. These statements all apply a subjective standard — and one substantially more at odds with the standard of Holland than the one the district court applied.
For these reasons, I do not agree that the circuit court applied the proper test and would not reinstate that order. Instead, I would remand to the district court for application of the correct standard as stated in Holland.