To obtain modification of the maintenance aspect of a stipulation that has been incorporated but not merged into a divorce judgment, a party must show extreme hardship, not merely a substantial change in circumstances ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b]; Matter of Cohen v. Seletsky, 142 A.D.2d 111, 118-119). Respondent satisfied the extreme hardship standard. However, because he did not prove that his income would never recover, his request for a permanent reduction of his maintenance obligation was properly denied ( see Pintus v. Pintus, 104 A.D.2d 866, 869). If respondent's extreme financial hardship persists at the end of the period for which he has been granted a downward modification, he may make a further application for such relief.
Contrary to respondent's assertion, the court has the authority to increase the duration of a maintenance obligation ( see e.g. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b]; Popack v. Popack, 179 A.D.2d 746, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 754). However, the Hearing Examiner's assumption that Sheila gave up marital property or "perks" in return for longer or higher maintenance, which formed the basis for his decision to extend respondent's maintenance obligation, is not supported by the record.
The purpose of maintenance is to give the recipient spouse a sufficient period to become self-supporting ( see e.g. Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338, 343). Petitioner's contention that the aneurysm she sustained in 1997 has left her permanently unable to support herself is unsupported by the existing record. Indeed, we note that subsequent to her aneurysm, in 2000, petitioner accepted an in-court stipulation pursuant to which she was entitled to maintenance for only 10 years. This does not, however, preclude petitioner from obtaining a modification of the previously agreed upon support obligation upon a new, properly supported application.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.