DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the mother's contention, the testimony by the petitioner's expert as to the ultimate issue in this case, i.e., that the mother is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to adequately care for the subject child due to her mental illness, was clearly admissible ( Matter of Antonio Tyrone B., 298 A.D.2d 128).
The petitioner agency established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide proper and adequate care for the subject child by reason of her mental illness ( see Social Services Law §§ 384-b[g], [4][c], [6][a]; Matter of Hime Y., 52 N.Y.2d 242). After interviewing the mother, reviewing her records, and observing her interaction with the child, the court-appointed psychiatrist testified that the mother suffered from a mental disease and, based on the nature of the illness, the severity of the symptoms and the mother's noncompliance with and refusal to seek treatment, reached her conclusion, which was not rebutted by any opposing expert testimony and was corroborated by the credible evidence ( Matter of Pariis L. (Robert P.), 286 A.D.2d 501, 501-502). The mother does not challenge on appeal the permanent neglect finding entered against her.
There is no merit to the mother's contention that the Family Court should have ordered a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment is a dispositional alternative upon a finding of permanent neglect ( see Family Ct Act § 631). "There is no statutory provision providing for a suspended judgment when parental rights are terminated based on mental illness ( see Social Services Law § 384-b[g]; [4][c])" ( Matter of Dionne W., 267 A.D.2d 1096).
In any event, given the evidence at the dispositional hearing showing the mother's continuing inability to attend and complete a therapy program, "the suspended judgment she sought would not be in the child's best interests" ( Matter of Yvonne Cecilea Y., 293 A.D.2d 423, 424). Further, it was in the child's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights and free him for adoption by his foster parents. The mother had no realistic and feasible plan to provide an adequate and stable home for the subject child, she lacked insight into her need for continued treatment as reported by the court appointed psychiatrist, and the child has bonded with his foster parents, with whom he has lived almost his entire life, and who have provided him with a stable, adequate, and loving home ( see Matter of Marie J., 307 A.D.2d 265; Matter of Yvonne Cecilea Y., supra; Matter of Latasha W., 268 A.D.2d 340; Matter of Latesha Nicole M., 219 A.D.2d 521).
The mother's remaining contention is without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., FLORIO, SCHMIDT and MASTRO, JJ., concur.