The motion court properly found that plaintiffs were without standing to assert claims for legal malpractice against the attorney defendants. Those defendants were retained by the corporate defendants to represent them and were not in privity with plaintiffs ( see Walker v. Saftler, Saftler Kirschner, 239 A.D.2d 252; C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M. Indus. Corp., 213 A.D.2d 846). While plaintiffs maintain that the attorney defendants colluded with defendant corporate board members Lyons and Gallagher to defraud minority shareholders such as themselves and that the relationship of privity ordinarily requisite to the maintenance of malpractice claims such as those they would assert may therefore be dispensed with ( see Good Old Days Tavern, Inc. v. Zwirn, 259 A.D.2d 300; Caiati v. Kimel Funding Corp., 154 A.D.2d 639), plaintiffs' allegations of collusion and fraud were not pleaded in sufficient detail to sustain either the complaint or the proposed amended complaint ( see CPLR 3016[b]). Nor may plaintiffs, as shareholders, assert malpractice claims on the corporations' behalf, since they never demanded that the corporation itself pursue such claims ( see Business Corporation Law § 626[c]), and neither the complaint nor the proposed amended complaint set forth with the required particularity circumstances from which it could be concluded that a demand by plaintiffs upon the corporations to initiate legal action against the attorney defendants would have been futile ( see Bansbach v. Zinn, 1 N.Y.3d 1, 16-17; Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 198-201).
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.