DUNN v. KEY BANK OF ALASKA

JOHN SEDWICK, District Judge

At docket 23, defendants Key Bank of Alaska and Keycorp. move for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendants claim they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they are not proper party defendants. The motion is opposed. Oral argument has not been requested, and it would not assist the court.

This case involves a dispute arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"). The court incorporates its February 6, 2004 order for a comprehensive review of the facts and procedural history. The court's February 6th order dismissed Dunn's state law claims because it determined that ERISA precluded those claims. Other facts and the court's analysis are set out below. The court's jurisdiction is based upon federal question jurisdiction.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to material facts and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to material fact. The moving party need not present evidence; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material fact. Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.

Key Bank of Alaska and KeyCorp. (collectively "KeyCorp. defendants") argue that while they established and maintained the subject employee benefit plan (the "plan"), they neither administered the ERISA benefits nor made discretionary benefit decisions; therefore, KeyCorp. defendants are improper parties to the instant action. KeyCorp. defendants further maintain that Unum Life Insurance Company of America ("Unum") is the party that controls the administration of the plan; therefore, it alone is the proper party to the instant action. Dunn responds that KeyCorp defendants' "intimate" involvement in the administration of plan benefits precludes summary judgment on this issue.

In her complaint, Dunn alleges Unum is the long-term disability plan's administrator and the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of KeyCorp — Henry L. Meyer, III — is the named fiduciary of the subject plan. Dunn claims that defendants violated ERISA by wrongfully denying a continuation of her disability benefits. ERISA allows suits to recover benefits only against the Plan as an entity or the plan's administrator. Dunn alleges that the defendants shared control of the plan's administration; therefore, all defendants are plan administrators.

ERISA defines a plan administrator as the person who is "designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated." Here, Unum is designated as the plan administrator of KeyCorp's employee benefit policy. Furthermore, the correspondence related to the denial and appeal of Dunn's continuing long-term disability benefits are generated by and directed to Unum. Dunn argues that KeyCorp. defendants were involved in discretionary acts earlier in the process; therefore, KeyCorp. defendants' control of the employee benefit plan overlapped Unum's responsibilities. However, Dunn's proffered exhibits do not support her claims that KeyCorp defendants exercised discretionary authority over her disability benefits. Rather, her assertions are speculative and conclusory. KeyCorp's request for medical information or its dissemination of claims information does not necessarily involve discretionary authority or control over benefit eligibility or claim processing.

Dunn's analogy to the First Circuit's decision in Law v. Ernst Young is misplaced. There, the plaintiff alleged that Ernst Young — his employer — violated its fiduciary duty, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), by failing to respond to his request for plan information. The Lawcourt concluded that even though another entity was designated as the plan administrator, Ernst Young was a de facto administrator liable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) because ERISA "confers upon plan participants and beneficiaries an absolute right to receive from the administrator" plan information, and Ernst Young "acted as the plan administrator in respect to dissemination of information concerning plan benefits." The ERISA subsection at issue in Lawimposes a specific duty on a plan administrator to provide a participant with plan information within thirty days. Such is not the case here. Dunn's claim for wrongful denial of long-term disability benefits is addressed under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which involves discretionary decisions — not solely administrative activities. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, in Moran v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, rejected the de facto plan administrator concept when the plan identifies a specific administrator. Here, Unum is specifically designated as the plan administrator, and KeyCorp. defendants' ministerial tasks do not rise to the level of "controlling" the plan's administration.

Dunn fails to provide evidence that KeyCorp. defendants engaged in discretionary conduct within the ambit of the employee benefit plan or controlled claim eligibility or processing. The KeyCorp. defendants' collection of certain medical information, which was forwarded to Unum for claim determination, is insufficient evidence of plan control. Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact are absent; thus, summary judgment concluding that KeyCorp. defendants are improper parties is appropriate.

For the reasons set out above, defendants Key Bank of Alaska and KeyCorp.'s motion for partial summary judgment at docket 23 is GRANTED.