DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an evidentiary hearing and a new determination on the motion.
CPLR 208 provides for a toll of the statute of limitations where the person entitled to commence an action is under a disability for, among other conditions, insanity ( see Costello v. North Shore Univ. Hosp. Ctr. for Extended Care and Rehabilitation, 273 A.D.2d 190, 191). The insanity toll was "meant to extend * * * to only those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society" ( McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Amer., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548; see Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 65 N.Y.2d 664).
The defendants met their initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time to commence an action against them had expired ( see Robertson v. Motorola Communications Elecs., 299 A.D.2d 534; Savarese v. Shatz, 273 A.D.2d 219, 220; CPLR 214-a). The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to "`aver evidentiary facts' establishing that the case falls within an exception to the [s]tatute of [l]imitations" ( Assad v. City of New York, 238 A.D.2d 456, 457, quoting Siegel v. Wank, 183 A.D.2d 158, 159). The certified hospital records submitted by the plaintiff did not resolve the issue in her favor, but created an issue of fact as to the period of time during which she was unable to protect her legal rights. On the paucity of the record for the period of time from December 30, 1999, to February 15, 2000, this court cannot determine whether the plaintiff's disability persisted until February 15, 2000, two years and six months before the filing of the complaint ( see Santana v. Union Hosp. of Bronx, 300 A.D.2d 56, 58; Lynch v. Carlozzi, 284 A.D.2d 865, 868; see also Seppala v. Meadowbrook Care Ctr., 292 A.D.2d 368, 369).
Therefore, in accordance with the parties' request, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the period of time the plaintiff was "unable to protect [her] legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society" ( McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Amer., supra at 548; see Santana v. Union Hosp. of Bronx, supra; CPLR 304; cf. CPLR 3211[c]). A new determination on the motion should be made after that hearing.
ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, GOLDSTEIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.