The motion court correctly held that the first alleged oral agreement, providing for defendant's hiring of plaintiff to act as its billing administrator with respect to the new subscriber, cannot be enforced due to the lack of material terms ( see Matter of Express Indus. Term. Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 N.Y.2d 584, 589-590), including the new subscriber's assent to the arrangement, and the terms and conditions of the alleged employment. The motion court also correctly held that the second alleged oral agreement, providing for defendant's payment of a broker's commission if and when Insurance Law § 4312 were amended to allow not-for-profit insurance companies to use brokers, would compensate a broker for negotiating a business opportunity, and is therefore barred by the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701[a][10]). The September 1993 letter signed by defendant's vice-president does not indicate, inter alia, contract duration, rate of compensation or indeed any of defendant's promises given in exchange for plaintiff's services, and therefore fails to satisfy the statute of frauds ( see Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 378-379, citing, inter alia, Stulsaft v. Mercer Tube Mfg. Co., 288 N.Y. 255, 258). In view of the parties' prior relationship, plaintiff's introduction of defendant to the new subscriber could have been done with the expectation that defendant would engage plaintiff as broker for other, future opportunities arising after amendment of the law, and therefore was not part performance unequivocally referable to the alleged oral contracts ( see Baytree Assoc. v. Forster, 240 A.D.2d 305, 307, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 810).
We have considered plaintiff's other arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.