Inasmuch as plaintiff has not offered a reasonable explanation for his persistent failure to comply with compulsory and, indeed, court-ordered discovery respecting his finances, we perceive no ground to conclude that his default was other than willful ( see Sanchez v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 127), or that it did not warrant his preclusion from offering evidence pertaining to finances at trial, and, accordingly, find no basis to disturb the denial of his motion for relief from the ensuing divorce judgment ( see Dimitratos v. City of New York, 180 A.D.2d 414).
While the doctrine of judicial estoppel ( see DL Holdings, LLC v. RCG Goldman Co., LLC, 287 A.D.2d 65, 71, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 611) has been applied in matrimonial actions ( see e.g. Crespo v. Crespo, 309 A.D.2d 727), its application in this case against defendant to prevent her, by reason of her position in the parties' prior bankruptcy proceeding, from presenting evidence respecting her needs and the needs of the parties' three children, would not have been appropriate. Such evidence, as distinguished from evidence of plaintiff's ability to pay, which defendant did not affirmatively present, was not even arguably inconsistent with, much less contrary to, defendant's position in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Lastly, plaintiff's contention that the court did not protect his rights as a pro se litigant is belied by the record.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.