Since the defendant was only charged with a traffic infraction, he has no right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 ( People v. Taylor, 189 Misc 2d 313 [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists 2001]). However, the defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20 ( id.). In determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the following factors must be considered: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" ( People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445). It is our opinion that the 14-month delay between the date defendant was charged and the date of trial was not sufficient to require dismissal based on defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Furthermore, defendant has not established that his defense was impaired by reason of the delay. In light of the foregoing, the defendant failed to adequately establish a sufficient basis to warrant the granting of his motion pursuant to CPL 30.20.
We find defendant's remaining contention to be lacking in merit.