DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
The plaintiff slipped and fell on a combination of ice, water, and snow in the parking lot of her employer. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the appellant Regional Maintenance Corp., which had a snow removal maintenance contract with the plaintiff's employer.
The Supreme Court should have granted the appellant's motion since the appellant "assumed no duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the plaintiff by virtue of its contractual duty to remove snow from the subject premises" ( DeCurtis v. T.H. Assocs., 241 A.D.2d 536, 537; see Pavlovich v. Wade Assocs., 274 A.D.2d 382). The contract between the appellant and the plaintiff's employer was not a comprehensive and exclusive contract which displaced the employer's duty as a landowner to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition ( see Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579; Eidlisz v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 302 A.D.2d 558). Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, there was no evidence that the appellant "launched a force or instrument of harm" and thus created or exacerbated a hazardous condition ( H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168; see Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs. Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 139; Cochrane v. Warwick Assocs., 282 A.D.2d 567, 568; Murphy v. M.B. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 280 A.D.2d 457; Phillips v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 215 A.D.2d 825).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the appellant's remaining contention.
GOLDSTEIN, J.P., H. MILLER, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.