DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Based on the evidence presented by the defendant in support of its motion, which indicated that a storm was in progress at the time of the plaintiff's accident, the defendant met its burden of establishing that it did not have a reasonably sufficient time to remedy the allegedly dangerous icy condition ( see Pelliccio v. TCW Realty Fund VIA Holding Co., 291 A.D.2d 388; DeMasi v. Radbro Realty, 261 A.D.2d 354).
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she slipped on ice that was present from a previous storm ( see Dowden v. Long Is. R.R., 305 A.D.2d 631; Pepito v. City of New York, 262 A.D.2d 619, 620). Her assertion that the ice patch existed for a sufficiently long time to have provided constructive notice and a sufficient amount of time to remedy the condition can only be based upon speculation ( see Sellet v. United Artists Theaters, 251 A.D.2d 488, 489; Bertman v. Board of Mgrs. of Omni Ct. Condominium I, 233 A.D.2d 283).
Accordingly, the defendant's motion was properly granted.
GOLDSTEIN, J.P., H. MILLER, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.