DELTA FUNDING CORP. v. MURDAUGH

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

2002-08552.

Attorney(S)

Jacob, Medinger Finnegan, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Bryan A. McKenna of counsel) and Donna Dougherty, Rego Park, N.Y. (Kimberly Madden of counsel), for appellant (one brief filed). Certilman Balin Adler Hyman, LLP, East Meadow, N.Y. (M. Allan Hyman of counsel) and Ballard Spahr Andrews Ingersoll, LLP, Philadelphia, Pa. (Martin C. Bryce of counsel), for respondent (one brief filed).

Acts

Commerce And Trade — Consumer Credit Protection — Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure — General Provisions — Congressional Findings And Declaration Of Purpose
Commerce And Trade — Consumer Credit Protection — Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure — Credit Transactions — Civil Liability

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a residential mortgage foreclosure action initiated by Delta Funding Corporation against Dorothy Murdaugh, the appellant. In response, Murdaugh interposed various counterclaims seeking damages based on alleged violations of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) and New York General Business Law § 349. The Supreme Court, Queens County, granted summary judgment dismissing those counterclaims on statute of limitations grounds and other bases. The appellant limited her appeal to the dismissal of these counterclaims, challenging the order dated May 28, 2002.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appellant’s counterclaims for damages under the federal Truth-in-Lending Act are barred by the statute of limitations or are timely as a matter of law.
Whether the appellant stated a prima facie cause of action under General Business Law § 349 based on alleged consumer-oriented misleading practices by the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410	Interpretation of TILA’s statute of limitations and recoupment rights	Supported the conclusion that TILA counterclaims may be timely if asserted as a defense by recoupment in a debt collection action.
Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 63 A.D.2d 193, affd 47 N.Y.2d 182	Application of recoupment defenses under TILA and timing of claims	Reinforced that TILA claims can be asserted beyond one year as a defense to foreclosure actions.
First Trust Natl. Assn. v. Chiang, 242 A.D.2d 599	Statute of limitations and recoupment under TILA	Confirmed the viability of TILA counterclaims in foreclosure proceedings despite the one-year limitations period.
Community Natl. Bank Trust Co. of N.Y. v. McClammy, 138 A.D.2d 339	Recoupment and set-off defenses in mortgage foreclosure	Supported the court’s holding that damages under TILA may offset deficiency judgments.
Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24	Elements of a claim under General Business Law § 349	Provided the standard for establishing a consumer-oriented deceptive practice and injury.
New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308	Interpretation of General Business Law § 349 claims	Clarified the consumer protection scope and injury requirement under GBL § 349.
Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 20	Consumer-oriented deceptive practices under GBL § 349	Supported the finding that the appellant alleged sufficient facts to state a prima facie claim.
Negrin v. Norwest Mtge., 263 A.D.2d 39	Application of GBL § 349 in mortgage-related consumer claims	Affirmed the court’s conclusion that the appellant’s allegations met the prima facie requirements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appellant’s counterclaims under both TILA and General Business Law § 349. Regarding TILA, the court relied on the statutory provision that the one-year statute of limitations does not bar a person from asserting a violation as a defense by recoupment or set-off in an action to collect the debt. This interpretation allowed the appellant’s TILA counterclaims to proceed to the extent they could offset any judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court also found that the appellant sufficiently alleged a prima facie case under General Business Law § 349 by showing that the plaintiff engaged in consumer-oriented misleading practices causing injury, thereby justifying reinstatement of those counterclaims.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the order of the Supreme Court insofar as it dismissed the appellant’s counterclaims under the Truth-in-Lending Act and General Business Law § 349. The motion branches seeking dismissal of these counterclaims were denied, and the counterclaims were reinstated with costs awarded to the appellant.

This decision directly affects the parties by allowing the appellant to pursue her counterclaims in the foreclosure action. The court did not establish new precedent but applied existing statutory and case law principles concerning TILA’s statute of limitations and consumer protection claims under GBL § 349.

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DELTA FUNDING CORPORATION, respondent, v. DOROTHY MURDAUGH, appellant, ET AL., defendants.

DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, those branches of the motion which were to dismiss so much of the appellant's counterclaims as sought to recover damages pursuant to the federal Truth-in-Lending Act and pursuant to General Business Law § 349 are denied, and those counterclaims are reinstated.

In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the appellant interposed various counterclaims, inter alia, to recover money damages based on the plaintiff's alleged breach of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) (hereinafter TILA) and General Business Law § 349. The Supreme Court dismissed so much of the appellant's first counterclaim as sought to recover damages under TILA, based on the statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court also dismissed the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth counterclaims alleging violations of General Business Law § 349. We reverse.

With respect to the TILA counterclaim for damages, the statute states, in relevant part, "This subsection [providing for the one-year statute of limitations] does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action" ( 15 U.S.C. § 1640[e]). Pursuant to this provision, the appellant's counterclaims to recover damages under TILA are timely to the extent that such damages might offset any damage award or deficiency judgment that might be made in favor of the plaintiff and against her ( see CPLR 203[d]; Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410; Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 63 A.D.2d 193, affd 47 N.Y.2d 182; First Trust Natl. Assn. v. Chiang, 242 A.D.2d 599; Community Natl. Bank Trust Co. of N.Y. v. McClammy, 138 A.D.2d 339).

The appellant also made out a prima facie case pursuant to General Business Law § 349 by alleging that the plaintiff was engaged in a consumer-oriented misleading practice and that the appellant was injured thereby ( see Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24; New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308; Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 20; Negrin v. Norwest Mtge., 263 A.D.2d 39).

PRUDENTI, P.J., GOLDSTEIN, LUCIANO and COZIER, JJ., concur.