DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Generally, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping automobile establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to explain how the accident occurred ( see Shamah v. Richmond County Ambulance Serv., 279 A.D.2d 564; Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458; Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392; Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635). However, here, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority and Colin Thorne for summary judgment insofar as asserted against them since triable issues of fact exist as to whether Thorne, the driver of the vehicle which was struck in the rear, contributed to the accident ( see Chepel v. Meyers, 306 A.D.2d 235; Rosa v. Colonial Tr., 276 A.D.2d 781; Gildersleeve v. Leo, 274 A.D.2d 547; Martin v. Pullafico, 272 A.D.2d 305; Maschka v. Newman, 262 A.D.2d 615; Niemiec v. Jones, 237 A.D.2d 267; Migdol v. Striker, 215 A.D.2d 358; DeCosmo v. Hulse, 204 A.D.2d 953).
KRAUSMAN, J.P., ADAMS, COZIER and RIVERA, JJ., concur.