DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
Generally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous and defective condition in or the negligent maintenance of a public sidewalk is placed on the municipality and not on the abutting landowner ( see Hausser v. Giunta, 88 N.Y.2d 449). However, liability can be imposed on an abutting landowner where the sidewalk was constructed in a special manner for the benefit of the abutting landowner, where the abutting landowner affirmatively caused the defect, where the abutting landowner negligently constructed or repaired the sidewalk, or where a local ordinance or statute specifically charges an abutting landowner with a duty to maintain and repair the sidewalk and imposes liability for injuries flowing from a breach of that duty ( see Hausser v. Giunta, supra at 452-453; Scheer v. Roth, 280 A.D.2d 595; Martinez v. City of New York, 270 A.D.2d 235).
Under the foregoing standard, the appellant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320). Even assuming that the cellar door in the sidewalk, which led to the appellant's building, constituted a special use, the appellant demonstrated that the door did not proximately cause the plaintiff's accident ( see Salas v. City of Yonkers, 294 A.D.2d 419). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., supra; Salas v. City of Yonkers, supra).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
H. MILLER, J.P., LUCIANO, SCHMIDT and TOWNES, JJ., concur.