ANCER HAGGERTY, District Judge
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. # 152) after defendants's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by Order issued February 2, 2004 (Doc. # 148). Judgment dismissing the action with prejudice was entered on February 3, 2004 (Doc. # 149).
Counsel for plaintiff asserts that defendants inflicted "progressive retaliation" upon plaintiff, and that this retaliation has been "sanctioned and perhaps even facilitated by" the court presided by the Honorable Judge Anna J. Brown. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment at 2.
Counsel also complains that the court afforded defendants "two opportunities at their summary judgment," deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to present either live testimony or oral argument, and ruled in favor of the defense "on every single matter over the entire course of this lawsuit." Id. Counsel contends that the court sanctioned plaintiff without merit, and, moreover, that it is "well understood that this Court comes from an insurance defense background that may render it unable to [be] fair and unbiased toward a Plaintiff and her lawyer." Id.
In light of these charges, this aspect of plaintiff's Motion for Relief is construed as a Motion for Recusal, and the undersigned has performed an independent examination of the Record of this litigation. Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal is denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge must seek recusal "in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Such decisions are evaluated by asking whether "an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts . . . [could] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal. . . ." United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2nd Cir. 1992) (citing DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2nd Cir. 1988)). A federal judge shall also recuse him or herself "[w]here he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Section 455(b)(1).
To be disqualifying, the judge's bias or prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984). Without evidence of a deep-seated antagonism that would have made fair judgment impossible, this aspect of plaintiff's motion must be denied. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (judicial rulings alone almost never are a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion; opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of judicial proceedings do not constitute a basis for recusal unless they indicate that the judge has "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible").
Plaintiff's allegations of personal bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Brown arise from plaintiff's dissatisfaction with prior rulings issued by Judge Brown. Such dissatisfaction is insufficient to compel the extraordinary remedy of judicial recusal, and counsel's assertions of Judge Brown's personal bias or animus are otherwise wholly unsubstantiated. Moreover, the rationalization of compelling recusal of judges in circumstances such as those raised here could lead to a serious procedural morass for the federal court system and could encourage an unjust form of "judge shopping" after a party is disappointed in a particular ruling.
CONCLUSION
The portion of plaintiff's Motion for Relief pertaining to the possible recusal of Judge Anna J. Brown is denied. Now pending before Judge Brown is the remainder of the Motion for Relief (Doc. # 152).
IT IS SO ORDERED.