ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The elements needed for the imposition of a constructive trust are (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment ( see Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 241-242; Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121; Levy v. Moran, 270 A.D.2d 314, 315; Ostreicher v. Ostreicher, 238 A.D.2d 392, 393). In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient evidence, beyond mere conclusory assertions, to support the imposition of a constructive trust ( see Kleinman v. Kleinman, 281 A.D.2d 459, 460; Ostreicher v. Ostreicher, supra; Gluck v. Fleischman, 233 A.D.2d 420; Doria v. Masucci, 230 A.D.2d 764, 765-766; see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557) . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that he had any interest in the property before obtaining the promise to convey it to him ( see Martin v. Martin, 169 A.D.2d 821, 822; Matter of Lefton, 160 A.D.2d 702, 703-704; Gargano v. V.C. J. Constr. Corp., 148 A.D.2d 417, 419; Scivoletti v. Marsala, 97 A.D.2d 401, 402, affd 61 N.Y.2d 806; cf. Ladone v. Ladone, 121 A.D.2d 512, 513.
Also, upon the defendant's prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to his cause of action alleging actual fraud. To sustain a cause of action based on actual fraud, the plaintiff had to establish that (1) the defendant made material representations that were false, (2) the defendant knew the representations were false and made them with the intent to deceive the plaintiff, (3) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's representations, and (4) the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's representations ( see Giurdanella v. Giurdanella, 226 A.D.2d 342, 343; Matter of Garvin, 210 A.D.2d 332, 333). The general rule is that fraud cannot be predicated upon statements that are promissory in nature at the time they are made and which relate to future actions or conduct ( see Rand v. Laico, 282 A.D.2d 444; Rapanakis v. Athanasiou, 250 A.D.2d 583, 584; Brown v. Lockwood, 76 A.D.2d 721, 731, cf. Banc of Am. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Issacharoff, 188 Misc.2d 790, 793-794). The plaintiff failed to sufficiently demonstrate that he justifiably relied, to his detriment, upon the defendant's alleged misrepresentation. Indeed, the alleged misrepresentation amounted to nothing more than a mere unfulfilled promise as to what the defendant would do in the future, and thus, it is not actionable as fraud ( see Brown v. Lockwood, supra). In addition, the Supreme Court correctly denied the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend his complaint ( see Leszczynski v. Kelly McGlynn, 281 A.D.2d 519, 520; Tarantini v. Russo Realty Corp., 273 A.D.2d 458, 459).
In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the plaintiff's remaining contentions.
SMITH, J.P., KRAUSMAN, CRANE and MASTRO, JJ., concur.
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