LEWIS, JUDGE.
The plaintiff, the New York State Department of Taxation, has brought an action against the defendant, Joseph Longo, a Connecticut resident, alleging that it obtained a judgment against the defendant on August 29, 1991, which was docketed with the clerk for Albany County, New York, for approximately $98,000 for unpaid sales and use tax. The plaintiff further alleges that it has made demand on the defendant for this amount, but that the defendant refuses to pay said judgment. The plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
The complaint does not allege whether the action is based on a statute, but in a memorandum in support of its motion to strike, the plaintiff indicates that the action was brought pursuant to General Statutes § 50a-30. The defendant correctly pointed out that this statute involved the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, which does not pertain to other states, but rather to foreign countries.
In its memorandum, the plaintiff specifically states that its action was not based on General Statutes § 52-604 et seq., the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments act. Moreover, the plaintiff did not comply with that statute by filing the certification required by General Statutes § 52-605. Evidently, the plaintiff is proceeding "by an action on the judgment . . . instead of proceeding under sections 52-604 to 52-609 [which right] remains unimpaired." General Statutes § 52-607.
This statute provides, among other things, that: "[s]uch foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and CT Page 6905 proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." General Statutes § 52-605(b).
In any event, the defendant filed a special defense that he was not personally responsible for the payment of such taxes to the state of New York as he was an officer of International Dynetics Corporation and not individually liable. In his counterclaim, the defendant makes the same claim and seeks to obtain the return of approximately $30,000, which the plaintiff seized from certain CT Page 6904 bank and stock accounts of the defendant.
The plaintiff filed motions #101 and #104 to strike the counterclaim and special defense, respectively. The plaintiff's theory is that these are not proper allegations in a case based on a judgment from another state. Practice Book § 10-39(a) authorizes the use of a motion to strike to contest the legal sufficiency of a counterclaim and of a special defense. In ruling on a motion to strike the court is "to examine the [contested pleading], construed in favor of the [pleading party], to determine whether the [pleading party] has stated a legally sufficient cause of action [special defense]." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the [pleading at issue]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
In support of its motion to strike, the plaintiff cites Rathkopf v. Pearson, 148 Conn. 260, 170 A.2d 135 (1961). Although the case refers to collateral attacks on the judgments of another state and whether such judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, the case does not involve a motion to strike, but rather pertains to summary judgment. Moreover, Rathkopf cites as an example of a valid defense, the lack of jurisdiction over the person. "Moreover, to be successful, a collateral attack must prove a judgment void, not merely voidable. Clark v. Platt, 30 Conn. 282, 285. Broadly stated, this would require proof of lack of . . . jurisdiction over the . . . parties . . ." Id., 265.
Since the type of judgment alleged in the complaint is subject to the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, and in light of the axiom that the counterclaim and special defense must be construed in favor of the defendant for the purpose of plaintiff's motion, there is no need or requirement to strike either the counterclaim or the special defense. Hence, the two motions to strike are denied.
William B. Lewis, Judge.