Defendant failed to rebut the presumption in Local Law 1 "that in any building erected prior to 1960, peeling paint in a dwelling unit occupied by a child six years of age or under comprises a hazardous lead condition" ( Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 N.Y.2d 628, 647). Given the presumption, it was defendant's burden to show the absence of hazard, not plaintiff's to show its existence ( cf. Woolfalk v. New York City Hous. Auth., 263 A.D.2d 355). Thus, it does not avail defendant to argue that plaintiff's expert's tests failed to show the existence of a dangerous level of lead in the apartment. In any event, defendant's evidence to that effect at best raised only issues of expert credibility as to whether the tests were properly performed and interpreted, which issues were properly submitted to the jury ( see Mejia v. JMM Audubon, 1 A.D.3d 261). A fair interpretation of the evidence, including, in particular, the testimony of plaintiff's expert neurologist, also supports a finding that even if the assertedly unreliable fingerstick test were disregarded, the level of lead in plaintiff's blood was high enough to cause the injuries she suffered ( see Seay v. Greenidge, 292 A.D.2d 173). The damage awards are not against the weight of the evidence and do not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation ( cf. id.; Sampson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 256 A.D.2d 19). We have considered defendant's other arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.