IN RE A.G

SACKETT, C.J.

Appellant-mother Tammy appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her three children. Tammy asks that we reverse or return the case for full briefing. She does not argue that there is not clear and convincing evidence supporting the ground urged for termination. She only argues her parental rights should not have been terminated because (1) she has a close bond with her children; (2) they will lose the benefit of their close bond with the oldest child, who still lives with her; and (3) the children had access, while in her care, to alternative suitable care. Tammy argues in the alternative that if termination was appropriate, custody should have been transferred to a licensed foster parent she knew rather than with a foster family in Illinois. We deny the request for full briefing and affirm the termination.

Tammy has three children: Charles, born January 5, 1987; Stephanie, born August 5, 1991; and Andrew, born September 15, 1994. The children's father has not maintained contact with them, and his rights to Stephanie and Andrew were terminated on the grounds of abandonment under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b) (2003). He is not a party to this appeal.

The Department of Human Services has had ongoing concerns with Tammy's parenting, and it has been providing her services since February of 1996, when the children were placed in the first of five or six foster care homes. Tammy suffers from alcoholism and mental illness, including bi-polar disorder. The children spent the following months in foster care: February 21, 1996 to September 12, 1996; October 28, 1998 to July 9, 1999; September 1, 2000 to September 13, 2000; August 22, 2002 to December 27, 2002; April 1, 2003 to November 26, 2003; and December 24, 2003 to the present time.

The children were removed, not for the first time, pursuant to an ex parte order following a child neglect report to the Department of Human Services on August 21, 2002. According to the report Tammy was intoxicated and yelling at the children, causing them to leave the house in the middle of the night in a storm to find their older brother, Charles. Tammy admitted to having an alcoholic relapse and failing to take her mental health medication. The children were found to be children in need of assistance on October 16, 2002. The Department of Human Services provided Tammy services including in-home therapy, drop-ins, Gannon Center Mental Health Services, and a program the State refers to as SASC. The children were returned to Tammy's care on approximately December 27, 2002. On April 1, 2003, due to another alcoholic relapse, the children were again removed. Tammy continued to receive services, including in-home therapy and drop-ins, supervised visits, SASC and outpatient therapy. She attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. The children were returned to Tammy's care on November 26, 2003 for an extended visit and trial return. In early December of 2003 the Department of Human Services recommended that the case be closed and the children remain in Tammy's care. On December 24, 2003, however, Tammy relapsed again, and the children were once again removed from her care. The termination petition followed.

There was evidence at the termination hearing that besides Tammy's long history of alcohol abuse and mental illness, she has a third offense Operating While Intoxicated charge pending, and she has occasionally made her children blow into the breathalyzer in her car so she can drive it. Tammy apparently is involved with a man who is also an alcoholic, and testimony at the hearing by a Department of Human Services social worker indicated she put his needs above those of her children. Tammy also sleeps with Andrew, in spite of his wishes to sleep alone, for purposes of comforting herself. The social worker also testified Tammy had both a lack of expectations for her children at times, as well as unrealistic expectations for her children at other times. There was a founded report of physical abuse by Tammy against Stephanie in January of 2002.

The State did not seek the termination of Tammy's rights to Charlie, and he remains in her care. Charlie, a junior in high school, is doing well and plans to join the military after graduation. He has a job and is surrounded by a support network, including a friend whose house he can go to in times of trouble.

Andrew has been diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and evidence at the hearing was that he needed structure and stability which Tammy could not provide. Both Andrew and Stephanie have voiced their preference not to return to their mother's care.

We review terminations of parental rights de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991).

Tammy argues, citing Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), that the court should not have terminated her parental rights because she has a strong bond with Stephanie and Andrew and because terminating her rights to them will distance them from Charlie, with whom they enjoy a strong bond. The State argues this and all of Tammy's claims were not preserved for our review, as the juvenile court did not address them, and there was no motion to enlarge under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).

We address the issues without determining if they are preserved for appellate review.

We first address Tammy's claim that her parental rights should not have been terminated because of the strong bond she has with her children. We recognize because of the children's ages and the time they have spent in their mother's home that the family is bonded and that in all probability the children will suffer as a result of the severance of their biological ties. Having said that, we find the law and facts support the termination of Tammy's parental rights to Stephanie and Andrew.

Under section 232.116(3)(c), a court need not terminate parental rights if it would be detrimental to the children due to a strong parent-child bond. We recognize Stephanie has a conflicting relationship with her mother and verbalized that she wished to be out of her mother's home and that her relationship with her mother damaged her confidence. Testimony also indicated Andrew had recently detached from his mother, expressed little concern about leaving her, and there is evidence his behavior and academics improved when he was in foster care. Stephanie is twelve years old, Andrew nine. We cannot assume at this age that the children fully understand the implications of severing the ties with their mother, and we consider that fact in determining the weight to be given to this evidence.

However, the strength of the bond the children have with their mother must be weighed against the problems they face in remaining in her care. There is no question that she loves them, but her mental health and substance abuse problems result in the children being deprived of stability. Her decision to drink and drive with them in her care puts their safety in jeopardy. There was testimony by therapist Jon Filitti, who appeared to have had substantial contact with the children and the family for the past year and a half, that termination of Tammy's rights to Stephanie and Andrew was in their best interest. Giving weight to Filitti's opinion, we cannot say, based on the evidence supporting termination, that the bond between the children and their mother should trump the decision to terminate parental rights where the other grounds for termination have not been challenged. Although a bond between Tammy and her children is a factor to consider, it is not an overriding consideration. See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341-42 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). We affirm on this issue.

Tammy also claims her parental rights should not be terminated because the children are bonded to their brother Charles, and separating them from him will be to their detriment. Charles has been an important influence for Stephanie and Andrew, and that bond does need to be maintained. Yet Charles is seventeen, goes to school, has a job, and does not always stay at his mother's house. He has been welcome to visit Stephanie and Andrew at their foster home as he chooses, and we trust the State will ensure this right continues and any foster or adoptive parents will recognize the need to ensure this bond continues. We will not reverse on this ground.

Tammy also argues her parental rights should not have been terminated because suitable alternative care is available. She specifically advances that Kim Schmitt is available to care for her children. Kim Schmitt is a licensed foster parent who earlier cared for Tammy's children. Placing the children with Kim would allow the children to remain in the same community as their mother and brother. Placement of a child under a permanency order has been held not to be a legally preferable alternative to termination of parental rights. See In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 67-68 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). The State seems convinced these children, if their parental rights are terminated, will be adopted. The State argues that termination will provide the children with more stability. We can only trust this is the case, though we recognized that under State care the children have lived in a number of homes and an initial adoptive placement did not work out. We will not reverse on the juvenile court's decision to terminate rather than to enter a permanency order.

Tammy also argues placement of her children should be with Kim Schmitt instead of with an Illinois foster family. From testimony it appears the Illinois foster family the children live with is related to their previous foster family, and the children know their new family. Tammy's parental rights have been terminated. She cites no authority, nor do we find any, to support a finding that she has standing to challenge a subsequent foster placement. We therefore cannot address the issue. We can only trust the State, having argued that termination will bring stability, will see that these children find it.