SCORDILL v. LOUISVILLE LADDER GROUP, LLC (E.D.La. 2004)

SARAH VANCE, District Judge

Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend judgment. For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion.

John Scordill is a welder. He purchased two stepladders at a Home Depot in 1997 or 1998. Both ladders were Davidson Model 592-61 stepladders, ladders that stand six feet tall and that are made of fiberglass rails and aluminum steps. The ladders were manufactured in 1996 by Louisville Ladder at a manufacturing facility in Monterrey, Mexico. While working on a job in Orleans Parish on February 16, 2002, Scordill placed one of the stepladders — the incident or subject ladder — alongside a wall. He asserts that he climbed up to the second rung of the ladder and turned around so that his back was to the ladder. He then reached up with his right hand to weld an I-beam to metal plates that had been installed the day before. He leaned his left elbow against the wall to steady himself, his left hand grabbing his right wrist to support the welding gun in his right hand. Scordill avers that the ladder then buckled beneath him. Scordill fell and sustained numerous injuries.

Plaintiffs sued defendant Louisville Ladder in state court and alleged claims of unreasonably dangerous manufacturing, unreasonably dangerous design, and failure to adequately warn. Plaintiffs assert that the ladder failed along its left front rail, just below the first rung of the ladder. Defendant removed the case to this Court. The Court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' inadequate warning and design defect claims but denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims. The Court also denied the defendant's motion to exclude the report and testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness, Greg Garic.

The Court conducted a three-day jury trial on plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims. At the end of the presentation of evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Court granted defendant's motion on plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claim based on a defect in the fiberglass of the ladder and denied it on plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claim based on a misplaced rivet in the ladder's rail. The Court submitted plaintiffs' remaining manufacturing defect claim to the jury. After deliberating, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Scordill's ladder was not unreasonably dangerous in composition or construction at the time it left defendant Louisville Ladder's custody. The Court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs now move for a new trial and alternatively to amend the judgment.

A. Motion for a New Trial 1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states that a district court may grant a new trial "on all or part of the issues . . . in an action which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." FED. R. Civ. P.59(a); see also Oyefodun v. City of New Orleans, 2001 WL 775574, *2 (E.D.La.). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Pryor v. Trane Company, 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998). Although Rule 59(a) does not enumerate grounds for a new trial, a district court may grant a new trial if the court finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive or inadequate, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course. See Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). Additionally, a new trial must be granted when the Court is unable logically to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict. See Willard v. The John Hayward, 577 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1978) ("If the jury gives inconsistent answers to special interrogatories, the case must be remanded for a new trial . . . only if there is no way to reconcile them."). And, when a motion for a new trial is based on evidentiary grounds, the court should not grant a new trial, unless "the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence." Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026.

The Fifth Circuit has held that the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is governed by the federal standard that when all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the verdict must stand unless the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary conclusion. See Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the Seventh Amendment as requiring that "facts once found by a jury in the context of a civil trial are not to be reweighed and a new trial granted lightly." Pagan v. Shoney's Inc., 931 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 620 (5th Cir. 1976)). In addition, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to determine. See Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1969).

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that the jury's verdict was unreasonable and against the weight of evidence, and new evidence came out during the trial that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Plaintiffs contend that they proved, without contradiction, that the placement of the rivet was not within the manufacturer's specifications. Plaintiffs also argue that defendant's opposition to their expert's opinion on causation was not based on the factual testimony of the eye witnesses to the accident. Lastly, plaintiffs assert that defendants admitted only at trial that the ladder was not designed for use by welders, and plaintiffs did not have this new evidence when the Court granted co-defendant Home Depot's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs also argue that a bold warning on the ladder that it was not intended for use by welders would have prevented Scordill from ever buying the ladder, and therefore the accident would not have occurred.

The jury concluded that the ladder was not unreasonably dangerous in composition or construction at the time it left Louisville Ladder's custody. Thus, the jury concluded that the ladder did not deviate in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or from otherwise identical products manufactured by Louisville Ladder. Plaintiffs arguments that this conclusion was unreasonable are unavailing. Although plaintiffs contend that they proved, without contradiction, that the rivet placement was not within the manufacturer's specifications, defendant points out that it presented evidence that called plaintiffs' calculations into question. Defense witness Michael Van Bree testified that the specification at issue was the distance from the edge of the flange to the center of the rivet hole, not to the center of the rivet. He testified that the location of the rivet within the hole can vary by several hundredths of an inch, and this variance could account for the supposed deviation noted by plaintiffs' expert. Defendant also noted that a precise measurement of the relevant distance was difficult due to the degradation of the incident ladder that resulted from the accident. Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the ladder did not deviate from the defendant's specifications. Further, even if the jury concluded that the ladder's construction deviated from the manufacturer's specifications, it could have reasonably concluded based on the evidence before it that the ladder did not deviate in a material way from the specifications because the misplacement of the rivet did not materially effect the strength and stability of the ladder. Defendant put on expert testimony that, based on tests of the same model ladder, the suggested misplacement of the rivet would not have materially compromised the ladder's strength. Accordingly, the Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the jury's findings were unreasonable and against the weight of evidence.

Plaintiffs argue that the jury improperly adopted the defendant's theory on causation, which ignored the factual testimony of the eye witnesses to the accident. Because the jury concluded that the ladder was not unreasonably dangerous, it did not reach the issue of whether the unreasonably dangerous characteristic proximately caused Scordill's accident. As such, any arguments that the jury unreasonably adopted defendant's causation theory are meritless.

The Court also rejects plaintiffs' arguments that it should grant a new trial as a result of defendant's testimony at trial that the ladder was not designed for use by welders. Scordill argues that if the ladder had a warning on it that it was not designed for use by welders, then he would not have purchased the ladder, and thus the accident would never have occurred. As the Court noted when it granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' inadequate warning claims, Scordill admitted that he did not read the instructions and warnings on the ladder. Thus plaintiffs' argument that he would not have purchased the ladder if it had contained a warning that warned that the ladder was not designed for use by welders falls flat.

Further, plaintiffs state that if they had known that the ladder was not designed for welders before the Court granted summary judgment on behalf of Home Depot, then "Home Depot would probably not have been dismissed." As noted by this Court in its order granting summary judgment in favor of Home Depot:

It is undisputed that Home Depot is not a manufacturer within the meaning of the [Louisiana Products Liability Act]. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(1). It is also undisputed that under Louisiana law, a non-manufacturing seller of a defective product is not responsible for damages in tort absent a showing that he knew or should have known the product was defective and failed to declare it. See Jackson v. Sears Authorized Retail Dealer Store, 821 So.2d 590, 593 (La.Ct.App. 2002).

Rec. Doc. 74, Order and Reasons dated Jun. 24, 2003. Even if the ladder's warnings were inadequate because they failed to state that the ladder was not designed for use by welders, there is no evidence that Home Depot knew or should have known of this allegedly inadequate warning. Thus, the Court rejects plaintiffs' contention that Home Depot would not have been entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims if plaintiffs had known the ladder was not designed for welders.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

1. Legal Standard

Plaintiffs move in the alternative to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Evidence 59 e). A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a motion under Rule 59(e). See Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993); Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173. A court's reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly. See Fields v. Pool Offshore, 1998 WL 43217, *2 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999); Bardwell v. George G. Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120, *1 (E.D. La.). The court must "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts." Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 355. Courts in this district hold that a moving party must satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Omni Bank, 1999 WL 970526, *3 (E.D. La.); Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1999 WL 796218, *1 (E.D. La.); Burma Navigation Corp. v. Seahorse, 1998 WL 781587, *1 (E.D. La.); Fields, 1998 WL 43217, at *2.

2. Analysis

For the same reasons that the Court denies plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, the Court also denies plaintiffs' alternative motion to alter or amend the judgment. As noted above, the Court rejects plaintiffs' arguments that the outcome of their claims would have been different if they had known before the trial that the ladder was not intended for use by welders. Because the Court finds that the jury reasonably determined that the ladder was not unreasonably dangerous in composition or construction, and the evidence that the ladder was not designed for use by welders would not have affected the resolution of plaintiff's claims, the Court concludes that the judgment in this matter does not result in manifest injustice.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment.