The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. The visit to defendant's apartment by his parole officer was reasonably related to the parole officer's official duties, and the search was permissible based on defendant's written consent ( see People v. Hale, 93 N.Y.2d 454; People v. Lopez, 288 A.D.2d 70, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 706).
The court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's parole status to complete the narrative of events leading up to his arrest ( see People v. Mims, 305 A.D.2d 226, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 623; People v. Chestnut, 254 A.D.2d 525, 526, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 871). Although defendant offered to concede certain potential issues, many aspects of the recovery of drugs from defendant's apartment would still have been incomprehensible to the jury absent an explanation of the relevant context. The probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, which was minimized by the court's suitable limiting instruction.
The court properly denied defendant's request for an adverse inference instruction regarding missing police documents, since the documents in question either did not qualify as Rosario material ( see People v. Sims, 282 A.D.2d 204, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 835; People v. Williams, 273 A.D.2d 79, 80, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 940), or were not established to have ever existed ( see People v. Cortijo, 254 A.D.2d 125, 126, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 1030). Furthermore, defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced ( see People v. Cooper, 292 A.D.2d 163, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 674).
Defendant waived any objection to testimony about an anonymous tip, since he introduced this evidence himself. Defendant's strategic decision to introduce this evidence was not the product of any adverse ruling by the court.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.