DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, it is clear from a November 20, 2000, letter (hereinafter the Letter) executed by the plaintiff Cary S. Frankel and by a real estate agent for the defendant Ford Leasing Development Company (hereinafter Ford Leasing), that the parties never had a meeting of the minds. The Letter expressly contemplated a more complete and formal contract and omitted many essential terms of a contract. The fact that the parties engaged in extensive negotiations and exchanged proposed purchase agreements further demonstrated the absence of a complete agreement. Thus, the Letter merely constituted an agreement to agree which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds ( see General Obligations Law § 5-703; Behar v. Mawardi, 268 A.D.2d 400; La Barca v. Altenkirch, 193 A.D.2d 586; Ramos v. Lido Home Sales Corp., 148 A.D.2d 598).
Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the actions taken by Frankel were not unequivocally referable to a contract of sale so as to constitute part performance sufficient to defeat the statute of frauds, and were merely steps taken in contemplation of a future agreement ( see General Obligations Law § 5-703; Messner Vetere Berger McNamee Schmetterer Euro RSCG v. Aegis Group, 93 N.Y.2d 229, 235, 237; Urgo v. Patel, 297 A.D.2d 376, 378; Francesconi v. Nutter, 125 A.D.2d 363). Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted Ford Leasing's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.
KRAUSMAN, J.P., LUCIANO, COZIER and SPOLZINO, JJ., concur.