PER CURIAM
We grant the application for re-hearing to address issues omitted from the original opinion dated April 7, 2004. By mischaracterizing the appellees' "Response" as a "failure to answer", we incorrectly applied La.C.C.P. art. 2133. We issue this per curiam to discuss those issues.
The appellees raise three points to support the premise that the arbitration agreement Addendum should not be enforced in the aforementioned case. The Dufrenes argue the arbitration agreement addendum is invalid because (1) it fails to comply with a requirement it be dated and signed by all parties, (2) the contract is adhesionary, and (3) the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq precludes enforcement. In its application for rehearing, the Dufrenes voluntarily discard the third contention, therefore we will not address the issue.
Both parties address only the Arbitration Agreement Addendum. The arbitration agreement which is signed by all parties is in the record.
The Dufrenes have argued that the Arbitration Agreement Addendum is invalid because it was not signed by Royer. This court has held that La.R.S. 9:4201 does not require that the written agreement to arbitrate be signed by the parties. Hurley v. Fox, 520 So.2d 467 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1988), on remand, 559 So.2d 887 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990). Absent a signature or a signing of an agreement, the effect or validity of the agreement may be shown by the actions and conduct by the parties. Cook v. AAA Worldwide Travel Agency, 352 So.2d 243 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 360 So.2d 839 (La. 1978). The Dufrenes do not deny that they signed both the Bill of Sale and the Arbitration Agreement Addendum, thereby agreeing to its terms including the provision for arbitration. Royer filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration to indicate his intention to arbitrate. Therefore we find that Royer's failure to sign did not invalidate the agreement and Royer's action show the effect or validity of the agreement. The Dufrenes also argue the Arbitration Agreement itself requires all parties to sign the agreement. After a thorough reading of the Arbitration Agreement and its Addendum, we do not find such explicit requirement. This assignment of error lacks merit.
The Dufrenes further contend that the Arbitration Agreement Addendum was adhesionary. The Louisiana Supreme Court defined a contract of adhesion as a standard contract, usually in printed form, prepared by a party of superior bargaining power for adherence or rejection of the weaker party. Often in small print, these contracts sometimes raise a question as to whether or not the weaker party actually consented to the terms. Golz v. Children's Bureau of New Orleans, Inc., 326 So.2d 865, 869 (La. 1976); Posadas v. The Pool Depot, 02-1819 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 858 So.2d 611. The mere fact that a contract contains an arbitration provision does not render it adhesionary. Sutton's Steel Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 00-511 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/13/00), 776 So.2d 589, 596.
In fact, it is well settled that a party who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its contents and cannot avoid its obligations by contending that she did not read it, that she did not understand it, or that the other party failed to explain it to her. Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983);Stadtlander v. Ryans's Family Steakhouses, Inc. 34, 384 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 794 So.2d 881.
As distinguished from the cases cited by the Dufrenes, we find that the language of the Arbitration Agreement Addendum is clear, that the print is not unreasonably small, and that the provisions of the arbitration are not unreasonably burdensome. Further, there has been no showing that the Dufrenes were placed in an unequal bargaining position, that they did not understand the agreement, or that they would have refused to purchase the mobile home had they been aware of the import of its terms. Clearly, the arbitration agreement in question does not meet the criteria of an adhesionary contract as set forth in the above jurisprudence.
We find the arguments are unpersuasive and maintain our reversal of the trial court's decision to deny Royer's motion to stay pending arbitration.