DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the cross motion and substituting therefor a provision denying the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although an insurance broker is generally considered to be an agent of the insured, a broker will be held to have acted as the insurer's agent where there is some evidence of "action on the insurer's part, or facts from which a general authority to represent the insurer may be inferred" ( Bennion v. Allstate Ins. Co., 284 A.D.2d 924; see U.S. Delivery Sys. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 265 A.D.2d 402; U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Manhattan Demolition Co., 250 A.D.2d 600; Incorporated Vil. of Pleasantville v. Calvert Ins. Co., 204 A.D.2d 689; Kamyr, Inc. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 152 A.D.2d 62). Here, the defendant State-Wide Insurance Company (hereinafter State-Wide) sustained its initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence indicating that the insurance broker was not acting as its agent when the broker increased the limits of the plaintiff's supplementary uninsured motorist coverage in the insurance binder. However, the evidentiary proof that the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion, and in support of his cross motion for summary judgment, raised an issue of fact as to whether the broker had apparent general authority to represent State-Wide when it issued the binder ( see Bennion v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra; U.S. Delivery Sys. v. National Union Fire. Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, supra; Incorporated Vil. of Pleasantville v. Calvert Ins. Co., supra; Morales v. Cozy Brokerage, 170 A.D.2d 201; Price v. Lawrence-Van Voast, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 727). Since there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether the broker was State-Wide's apparent agent, neither party is entitled to summary judgment at this juncture.
SANTUCCI, J.P., KRAUSMAN, SCHMIDT and RIVERA, JJ., concur.