DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as deferred until trial a decision on that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for reimbursement of medical expenses is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant's medical practice should be valued as of the date he merged his individual practice into a group practice known as Cardiology Consultants of Westchester, P.C. However, for purposes of equitable distribution, the valuation date of marital assets can be set at "anytime from the date of commencement of the action to the date of trial" (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]). The appropriate date for measuring the value of marital property is left to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]). Here the trial court providently exercised its discretion in selecting the merger date, which was approximately five months after commencement of the divorce action, as the valuation date for the defendant's medical practice ( see Lipsky v. Lipsky, 276 A.D.2d 753; Trivedi v. Trivedi, 222 A.D.2d 499; Heine v. Heine, 176 A.D.2d 77, 87-88; Cohn v. Cohn, 155 A.D.2d 412).
The trial court also properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to enjoin the defendant from gambling. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant's alleged gambling resulted in any wasteful dissipation of marital assets ( see Reich v. Reich, 278 A.D.2d 214; cf. Maillard v. Maillard, 211 A.D.2d 963; O'Sullivan v. O'Sullivan, 154 A.D.2d 850, 852).
Finally, a party may not appeal, as of right, from so much of an order as merely defers disposition of a motion until trial ( see Mintz v. Mintz, 266 A.D.2d 439). Accordingly, the appeal from that portion of the order which deferred until trial the resolution of that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for reimbursement of her yoga classes as unreimbursed medical expenses, for which the defendant was liable, is dismissed as leave to appeal has not been granted ( see Mintz v. Mintz, supra; Enzien v. Enzien, 149 A.D.2d 783; cf. Bergner v. Bergner, 170 A.D.2d 421, 422).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., SMITH, CRANE and FISHER, JJ., concur.