U.S. v. REYNA

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ, District Judge

On this date the Court considered the status of this case and various pending motions. The defendants, along with two other defendants, are charged in an Indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting.

It is hereby ORDERED that the following motions all filed by Giro Benitez on May 10, 2004 are denied without prejudice to refiling: Motion for Discovery of Facts and Data related to expert opinion testimony (docket no. 44), Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (docket no. 46), Motion for pretrial notice of other crimes (docket no. 48), Motion for Government Agents to Retain Rough Notes (docket no. 54), Motion for Disclosure of Impeaching Information (docket no. 56), and Motion for early production of Jencks material (docket no. 60).

On April 30, 2004, the Court signed a General Order of Discovery. In that Order the Court stated that should Defendant "require additional discovery not covered by this Order, he or she shall file a Motion for Discovery asking for the specific item that he or she is requesting with proper memorandum. . . ." The Order also required that the Government make various disclosures of evidence. It is assumed that the Defendant's counsel simply filed boilerplate discovery motions without regard to the April 30, 2004 order. However, if the Government has not made disclosures as previously ordered, the Defendant may file a Motion for Discovery.

The function of a bill of particulars is to provide the defendant with the information about the pending charges that is necessary to the preparation of his defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial. U.S. v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015(1980). A bill of particulars is not intended to allow generalized discovery. U.S. v. Davis, 582 F.2d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979). Similarly, it is not designed to compel the Government to give a "detailed exposition of its evidence or to explain the legal theories upon which it tends to rely at trial." Burgin, 621 F.2d 1359. In this case, the indictment, provides sufficient guidance as to the details of the offense for which the Defendant is charged. The Court finds that the Indictment coupled with the discovery practice in the Western District are sufficient to allow the Defendant to prepare his defense and to avoid any unfair surprise to the Defendant. See Davis, 582 F.2d at 951 (denying defendant's motion for bill of particulars where conspiracy charge was "simple and the charged heroin distribution pattern was wholly of a garden variety"); U.S. v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1989) ("It is well established that if the government has provided the information called for in some other satisfactory form then no bill of particulars is required."). Defendant's motion (docket no. 49) is DENIED.

It is hereby ORDERED that the following motion filed by Santos Alejandro Chavez's on May 12, 2004 is denied without prejudice to refiling: Motion for pretrial notice of other crimes (docket no. 65).

On April 30, 2004, the Court signed a General Order of Discovery. In that Order the Court stated that should Defendant "require additional discovery not covered by this Order, he or she shall file a Motion for Discovery asking for the specific item that he or she is requesting with proper memorandum. . . ." The Order also required that the Government make various disclosures of evidence. It is assumed that the Defendant's counsel simply filed a boilerplate discovery motion without regard to the April 30, 2004 order. However, if the Government has not made disclosures as previously ordered, the Defendant may file a Motion for Discovery.

Chavez's motion states that a review of the Government's file causes him to believe that the Government has relied upon an informer. Defendant does not articulate whether the informer was present at the time of the alleged offense, or a mere "tipster." The Government relying upon Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957), responds that the Defendant has failed to establish that disclosure is essential to a fair determination in this matter.

A district court weighs three factors to determine whether to grant or deny disclosure of an informant's identity: "(1) the level of involvement in the alleged criminal activity, (2) the help fulness of disclosure to any asserted defense, and (3) the government's interest in non-disclosure." U.S. v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 85 (5th Cir. 2003).

A defendant requesting disclosure of a confidential informant's identity has the burden of making an initial showing that the informant will provide essential information. U.S. v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1991)("Inasmuch as [Defendant] failed to provide evidence supporting the first two prongs of this circuit's test, we need not consider the strength of the government's interest in preserving the confidentiality of the informant's identity."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 975 (1992).

In this case the Defendant has failed to make an initial showing that the informant will provide essential information. Defendant's Motion (docket no. 62) is DENIED, subject to later reconsideration should Defendant demonstrate the need for the informant's testimony.

Defendants named in the same indictment should generally be tried together, particularly when they are allegedly members of a conspiracy. United States v. Manges, 110 F.3d 1162, 1174 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998). A general description of complexity or antagonistic defenses is not sufficient to show the "specific and compelling prejudice" necessary for reversal of a district court's denial of a motion to sever. U.S. v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 2004). In this case, Defendant argues that there may be widely disparate evidence presented at trial, cumulation of the evidence may confuse the jury, and a failure to sever may cause prejudice by association. Defendant fails to establish that: (1) a joint trial will prejudiced him to such an extent that the district court cannot provide adequate protection; and (2) any prejudice outweighs the government's interest in economy of judicial administration. U.S. v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.), 537 U.S. 1060 (2002). Defendant's motion for Severance (docket no. 63) is DENIED.