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Wesley F. Sine, Trustee, Plaintiff v. The Bank of New York, et al., Defendant. The Bank of New York, et al., Counter-Claim Plaintiffs

ORDER

JAMES CARR, District Judge

This is a declaratory judgment action initially filed by plaintiff Wesley F. Sine, Trustee for judgment creditors of the Delmarva Timber Trust (Delmarva), in the Marion County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. The defendant Bank of New York (Bank) removed the case to this court and filed a counter-claim against Sine. Thereafter the Bank sought and was granted temporary restraining orders and a preliminary injunction barring Sine from undertaking further actions, such as the one originally initiated in this case, to obtain certain assets which the Bank contended belonged to it, and as to which neither Sine nor Sine's judgment debtor, the Delmarva Timber Trust, had a lawful claim.

Believing Sine to have violated the restraining orders, the Bank sought a show cause order and hearing thereon, and as well, a preliminary injunction. Following a hearing on those motions, Sine and the President of Delmarva were found to be in contempt and sanctioned. In addition, the preliminary injunction issued. Those restraining orders and the injunction, inter alia, barred Sine from seeking to execute a judgment issued by a Utah state court against assets held in various names by the Bank.

Sine argued prior to the injunction's issuance that the temporary restraining orders had issued improperly under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283. The order granting the preliminary injunction rejected that contention. (Doc. 83).

Pending is Sine's motion, filed pro se on April 5, 2004, to modify the injunction. That order renews Sine's challenge to the injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act, presents evidence that was not presented at the hearing on the Bank's motion for injunctive relief, and makes various other arguments. For the reasons that follow, Sine's motion shall be overruled.

Throughout these proceedings, Sine has been represented by counsel. But from time to time he has filed pleadings pro se, and such proceedings have in the past been stricken due to the fact that Sine has continuously been represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. See Doc. 101.

The prohibition against "hybrid representation" — where a party both has an attorney and concurrently seeks to appear and act pro se — is well established. In a case like the instant case, in which the pro se participant was an attorney, a principal in the events leading to the litigation, and a witness (as Sine has been and no doubt will be in future proceedings), the First Circuit recently stated:

We need not linger long over McCulloch's asserted right to represent himself. McCulloch is both a lawyer and a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Thus, he ordinarily would have a right, in that capacity, to enter his appearance as counsel in a pending case. But this case is out of the ordinary in that McCulloch is a principal in the transaction that underlies the litigation. He has been deposed at length, and there is every reason to expect that he would be one of the main witnesses should a trial ensue. A lawyer is under an ethical obligation to refrain from appearing as counsel in a case in which he reasonably can anticipate that he will be called as a percipient witness. See ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.7(a); see also D.P.R.R. 83.5(a) (formerly Rule 211.4(b)) (incorporating the ABA Model Rules to govern attorney conduct in the District of Puerto Rico). Given the salience of that apothegm, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit McCulloch to act as co-counsel in this matter. See Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 828 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 150-52 (3d Cir. 2003).
Nor did McCulloch have a right to appear as co-counsel in his personal capacity (i.e., pro se). He is — and has been — represented by other counsel in the district court proceedings. A party has a right to represent himself or to be represented by an attorney, but he cannot have it both ways. There is no right to hybrid representation in the federal courts. United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 981 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121-22 (1st Cir. 1989).
To be sure, hybrid representation occasionally may be permitted in the trial court's discretion. Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1121. Such largesse is, however, to be dispensed sparingly. Id. There is nothing in the record that suggests that this case should come within the exception to this general rule. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McCulloch's plaint for what amounts to hybrid representation.
McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2004).

The Sixth Circuit takes the same approach toward hybrid representation. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1987). As the court noted in Mosely, one of the reasons for not allowing hybrid representation is that where a represented attorney-litigant seeks to act pro se, as well to be heard through counsel, "conflicts and disagreements as to trial strategy are almost inevitable." Id. This has proven to be so in this case, in which Sine, though counseled not to do so, retained possession of a $5.9 million bond in violation of a restraining order.

Sine cannot be a litigant with counsel one day, and act without counsel the next. His pending motion, having been filed without the signature of any of the three attorneys who have filed appearances, shall be stricken.

I shall, nonetheless, address the principal arguments made in the motion, as I find none of them persuasive. In doing so, however, I decline to consider any evidence that has been submitted in support of the motion that was not submitted at the hearing on the Bank's contempt motion and motion for preliminary injunction. There is no reason to believe that that evidence could not have been presented then.

The record at that hearing showed that the Bank was likely to prevail at trial on several issues. Among these are, principally, that it was the victim of a fraud perpetrated by the President of Delmarva, Donald Meddles, as aided and abetted by Sine. Sine, for his part, though purporting to act as trustee for judgment creditors of Delmarva, was doing so in a highly peculiar manner, suggestive of bad faith and breach of his putative fiduciary duties.

The evidence at the hearing showed, moreover, that the Bank was likely to prevail on its contention that the underlying judgment being executed by Sine had been procured by fraud, and was part of a scheme to procure assets belonging to the Bank by fraud, duplicity, and chicanery. At the time that judgment was entered, the Bank was not a party to the proceedings, though it was, at least indirectly, a focus of those proceedings.

To be sure, as Sine argues, the Bank became a party, over its objection, to those proceedings when, after filing a special appearance, its motion to vacate the judgment was granted in part and denied in part.

Had the dispute between the Bank and Sine remained in the Utah state courts, or had the Bank initiated the proceedings now pending before this court, Sine's arguments about the Anti-Injunction Act might have been more persuasive. Sine, however, initiated these proceedings against the Bank in Marion County. The Bank properly removed the suit against it to this court. It equally properly filed its counterclaim, which Sine defended vigorously.

Thereafter, when the Bank sought a temporary restraining order, and then an extension of that order, Sine, through counsel agreed to those requests. No mention was made by Sine's counsel of any potential violation of the Anti-Injunction Act. Though Sine later objected to this court's consideration of the Bank's motion for injunctive relief, I concluded that he had waived his right to make that assertion.

This unique combination of circumstances and events persuaded me, and continues to persuade me that my decisions to enforce the restraining orders (by finding Sine in contempt of those orders) and issue the injunction did not contravene the Anti-Injunction Act. The likelihood is substantial that the Bank will prevail in its contentions that: the underlying judgment, procured by Sine, is fraudulent; Sine does not have, and never has had a lawful claim to recover against the assets in dispute in this litigation; Sine voluntarily sought relief in a court in this State; Sine knew, or reasonably should have known that the Bank would take all available steps to oppose his efforts to obtain assets lawfully belonging to it; and Sine knowingly and deliberately violated the restraining orders as to which he had made no objection when they were entered.

My decision to grant injunctive relief, despite the stringent restraint of the Anti-Injunction Act, is, moreovever, grounded on the principle that, notwithstanding the Act, a federal court may enjoin enforcement of a fraudulently obtained state court judgment. E.g., Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 121 (1915); Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425, 427 (10th Cir. 1942);

I conclude, accordingly, that, even if Sine's motion were properly before me, its contentions are without merit.

It is, therefore,

ORDERED THAT plaintiff's motion to modify the order of March 29, 2004, be, and the same hereby is overruled.

So ordered.

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SINE v. BANK OF NEW YORK, (N.D.Ohio 2004)
(Jun 3, 2004)