DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion to vacate is denied, and the order dated July 11, 2003, is reinstated.
A party seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering must demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 141). The bare allegation by the defendants' attorney in an affirmation that the delay was caused by the defendants' insurance carrier was insufficient to excuse the over one-year delay in answering the complaint ( see Kaplinsky v. Mazor, 307 A.D.2d 916; Cilindrello v. Rayabin, 297 A.D.2d 699; Andrade v. Ranginwala, 297 A.D.2d 691; Warn v. Seung K. Choi-Lee, 291 A.D.2d 490). Furthermore, the defendants failed to demonstrate that they have a meritorious defense ( see Meretskaya v. Logozzo, 2 A.D.3d 599; Rieman v. Smith, 302 A.D.2d 510; Russo v. Scibetti, 298 A.D.2d 514). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' motion to vacate the order.
ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, SCHMIDT, COZIER and SKELOS, JJ., concur.