It is well settled that a court's inquiry is narrowly defined on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211. The court must "accept the facts alleged as true * * * and determine simply whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 484 [citation omitted]; see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88; Salles v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 300 A.D.2d 226). The complaint must be liberally construed (CPLR 3026; see New York Trap Rock Corp. v. Town of Clarkstown, 299 N.Y. 77), and the court must accept as true not only the material allegations of the complaint, but also "whatever can be reasonably inferred therefrom" in favor of the pleader ( McGill v. Parker, 179 A.D.2d 98, 105; see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 318). A court is further obligated to "sustain the pleading when a cause of action may be discerned, even if inartfully stated" ( Fischbach Moore, Inc. v. E.W. Howell Co., 240 A.D.2d 157).
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and construing the inferences that may be drawn therefrom in plaintiff's favor, we find that the instant complaint sufficiently alleges a claim of prima facie tort, namely: (1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) resulting in special damages, (3) without excuse or justification, and (4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful ( see Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 332).
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that certain overhead electric, cable and telecommunication wires owned and operated by defendants were interfering with its public works contract with the City of New York for the milling and grinding of certain public streets. In light of defendants' affirmative legal obligation to remove or alter their wires for public works construction (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 24-521; see City of New York v. Con. Edison, 274 A.D.2d 189, appeal dismissed, lv dismissed 96 N.Y.2d 727), we find that plaintiff's allegations permit the inference that defendants' failure to remove or alter the offending overhead wires was not inadvertent, but rather stemmed from an intentional decision for no legitimate reason, i.e., disinterested malevolence ( see Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, supra at 333).
Likewise, plaintiff's submission of the letters it sent to each of the defendants delineating the damages which it had allegedly incurred by defendants' failure to remove or alter the subject overhead wires sufficiently identified the actual losses necessary to satisfy the element of special damages of prima facie tort.
We have considered defendants' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.