DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The court has broad discretion in determining what, if any, sanction should be imposed for spoliation of evidence ( see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 309 A.D.2d 776). It may, under appropriate circumstances, impose a sanction "even if the destruction occurred through negligence rather than wilfulness, and even if the evidence was destroyed before the spoliator became a party, provided [the party] . . . was on notice that the evidence might be needed for future litigation" ( DiDomenico v. C S Aeromatik Supplies, 252 A.D.2d 41, 53; see Favish v. Tepler, 294 A.D.2d 396; Baglio v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 303 A.D.2d 341). Recognizing that striking a pleading is a drastic sanction to impose in the absence of willful or contumacious conduct, courts will consider the prejudice that resulted from the spoliation to determine whether such drastic relief is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness ( see Favish v. Tepler, supra). A less severe sanction is appropriate where the missing evidence does not deprive the moving party of the ability to establish his or her defense or case ( see Chiu Ping Chung v. Caravan Coach Co., 285 A.D.2d 621; Klein v. Ford Motor Co., 303 A.D.2d 376).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' answer. There was no evidence that the defendant Melody Fiorello acted willfully, contumaciously, or in bad faith when she threw out the subject ladder five days after the plaintiff's accident. Moreover, the court properly concluded that it did not deprive the plaintiff of the means to prove his case ( id.).
RITTER, J.P., ALTMAN, MASTRO and SKELOS, JJ., concur.