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Docket Number

A04A0758.

Attorney(S)

R. Gary Spencer, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Adam M. Hames, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

MIKELL, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Cain v. The State — Court of Appeals of Georgia (Decided June 18, 2004)

Factual and Procedural Background

Marvin Cain was indicted on multiple counts including armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, theft by receiving stolen property, malice murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The murder charge was severed from the remaining counts, and two separate trials were conducted: one for the robbery-related counts and a separate trial for the murder charge. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Cain's murder conviction and transferred the appeal as to the robbery-related offenses to this Court on jurisdictional grounds.

The robbery-related trial involved events that occurred on September 30, 1996. Pamela Roberts and her 14-year-old daughter, Ebony Mayfield, returned home in a green 1996 Ford Taurus rental car. A gunman approached Roberts, held a gun to her chest, ordered her back into the car, and when she refused, took the keys and drove off in the green Taurus. Roberts later positively identified Cain at trial as her attacker. Cain was observed driving a green Taurus later that night (about 11:00 p.m.) while accompanying his sister to the hospital. On October 4, 1996, an off-duty officer located a green Taurus matching the description; Cain was stopped and arrested after the tag matched a police bulletin. A subsequent search of a residence where Cain had stayed produced Roberts's personal documents.

Cain was convicted at trial of the robbery-related offenses (the opinion notes he was convicted of all charged offenses except theft by receiving). On appeal to this Court, Cain's sole enumerated error challenges the admission of three similar transaction offenses at his robbery-related trial. This opinion resolves that challenge.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of three similar transaction offenses to prove Cain's "bent of mind" and course of conduct in the robbery-related case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Cain's) Arguments

Cain asserted that the similar transaction evidence was inadmissible because the prior transactions were not sufficiently similar to the crimes charged to be probative of the robbery-related offenses.
He did not dispute that he committed the similar offenses or that the evidence was offered for an appropriate purpose; his challenge was focused solely on the degree of similarity required for admissibility.

Appellee's (State's) Position

The State introduced the three prior incidents to show Cain's bent of mind and course of conduct (specifically, a course of stealing cars in the southwest area of Atlanta) and relied on the established legal standard for admitting similar transaction evidence.
The State treated the prior incidents as sufficiently similar to the charged offenses such that proof of the earlier events helped prove an element of the later crime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Tubbs v. State, 263 Ga. App. 270 (2003)	Sets out the three-part standard for admitting evidence of prior crimes: (1) purpose, (2) sufficient evidence that accused committed the independent act, and (3) sufficient similarity/connection between offenses.	The court relied on Tubbs as the governing standard and applied it to conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the similar transaction evidence.
McKibbons v. State, 226 Ga. App. 452 (1997)	Cited as authority for the three-part standard governing similar transaction evidence (supporting Tubbs).	Used as supporting authority for the standard the court applied in evaluating admissibility.
Fields v. State, 223 Ga. App. 569 (1996)	Explains that when similar transaction evidence is offered to prove motive, intent, or bent of mind, a lesser degree of similarity is required than when offered to prove identity.	The court invoked Fields to justify applying a lesser similarity threshold because the State offered the prior acts to prove bent of mind and course of conduct rather than identity.
Cain v. State, 277 Ga. 309 (2003) (Supreme Court opinion)	Procedural history: identified that the appeal was originally filed in the Supreme Court and that the murder conviction was affirmed there; provided a summary of the charges and that the murder charge had been severed.	The Court of Appeals referenced the Supreme Court's earlier opinion as background and jurisdictional context for transferring the robbery-related appeal to this Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating and applying the well-settled standard for admitting evidence of prior crimes: the State must show (1) the evidence is introduced for an appropriate purpose, (2) there is sufficient evidence the accused committed the prior act, and (3) sufficient similarity or connection exists between the prior act and the charged offense so proof of the former tends to prove the latter. The court emphasized that a trial court's admissibility determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

In this case, the State introduced three prior incidents to demonstrate Cain's "bent of mind" and a course of conduct—specifically, a course of stealing cars in a particular area. The opinion notes Cain did not contest that he committed the prior offenses or that the evidence was offered for an appropriate purpose; his objection was limited to the insufficiency of similarity.

The court analyzed the admissibility under the controlling precedents and highlighted that when prior acts are offered to prove motive, intent, or bent of mind, the required degree of similarity is lower than when the evidence is offered to prove identity (citing Fields). The court also referenced Tubbs' articulation that the earlier incidents need only be sufficiently similar so that "proof of the earlier event helps prove an element of the later crime."

Applying these principles to the specific prior incidents—(1) a 1992 incident involving Cain in a stolen car (conviction for theft by receiving), (2) a 1993 incident where Cain was driving a stolen car (conviction for theft by receiving), and (3) a 1994 armed robbery in which a victim identified Cain and to which he pled guilty—the court concluded the incidents were sufficiently similar to show Cain's bent of mind and a course of conduct relating to stealing cars (particularly in the southwest Atlanta area). Because the admissibility determination rested within the trial court's discretion and the prerequisites for admission were satisfied under the cited standards, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Implications: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of the three similar transaction offenses and therefore affirmed the robbery-related convictions as challenged on appeal. The opinion concludes that the similar-transaction evidence was admissible to show bent of mind and a course of conduct and that admitting that evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The decision does not announce a new rule of law; it applies existing precedent (Tubbs, McKibbons, Fields) to the facts before the court and affirms the trial court's evidentiary ruling.

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CAIN v. THE STATE.

MIKELL, Judge.

This appeal was originally filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia, but a portion of the case was transferred to this Court on jurisdictional grounds. Cain v. State, 277 Ga. 309, 310 (1) ( 588 SE2d 707) (2003). In its opinion, the Supreme Court summarized the statement of the case as follows:

Marvin Cain was indicted for armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, theft by receiving stolen property, malice murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On Cain's motion, the murder charge was severed from the other charges. Two trials before two different juries were conducted, one for the robbery-related counts of the indictment, the second for the murder count. Convicted of all the charged offenses except theft by receiving stolen property, Cain raises issues on appeal relating to both the murder conviction and the robbery-related convictions.

(Footnote omitted.) Id. at 309-310. The Supreme Court affirmed Cain's murder conviction and transferred his appeal concerning the robbery-related offenses to this Court. Cain's sole enumerated error from that trial is that the court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence. We affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that on September 30, 1996, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Pamela Roberts and her 14-year-old daughter, Ebony Mayfield, returned home from a trip to the laundromat and grocery store. Roberts was driving a green 1996 Ford Taurus rental car because her own vehicle was undergoing repairs. Roberts testified that after Mayfield had gone inside the house, a man with a gun approached Roberts. She further testified that the man held the gun to her chest and ordered her to get back in the car, but she refused. At that point, Mayfield came outside and saw the gunman threatening her mother. Mayfield ran back into the house yelling "my mama is being robbed." The gunman grabbed the keys from Roberts and got into the car. At the same time, Roberts's husband, Ivory Lewis, ran out of the house. He testified that he saw the man fumble with the keys, get into the car, and reverse in an effort to pull around another parked car. Lewis further testified that he made eye contact with his wife's attacker. The man drove off in the green Taurus. Roberts immediately called the police. She provided a description of the gunman as having distinctive eyebrows, being between five feet, five inches, and six feet tall, and wearing dark baggy clothing, a hat, and gloves. At trial, Roberts positively identified Cain as her attacker.

The record shows that Cain was driving a green Taurus that same night at approximately 11:00 p.m. when he accompanied his sister, Demetria Cain, to the hospital after her three-year-old son was accidentally shot in the foot.

On October 4, 1996, an off-duty police officer, Thomas Christopher Shaw, saw a green Taurus that matched the description of the vehicle stolen from Roberts. After receiving confirmation from the dispatcher that the tag number on the vehicle matched the one in the police bulletin, Officer Shaw requested backup. Several police cars responded, and Cain was stopped and arrested without incident. After the arrest, Roberts and Lewis were asked to look at a photographic line-up. Roberts was unable to identify Cain; however, Lewis identified him as the person who stole the car from Roberts.

Tyrone Fennie, Cain's brother-in-law, who was estranged from Demetria Cain at the time in question, testified that Cain spent several nights at his home during the week of September 30, 1996. When approached by police officers on October 4, Fennie consented to a search of his home and actually provided the officers with a key. Detective Reed Pollard of the College Park Police Department testified that in addition to obtaining Fennie's consent, the officers also had a search warrant. They discovered a manila folder containing personal documents belonging to Roberts.

In his sole enumerated error, Cain complains that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of three similar transaction offenses. We disagree.

The standard for admitting evidence of prior crimes is well settled:

The State must show that (1) it is introducing evidence of an independent offense or act for an appropriate purpose, (2) there is sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the independent offense or act, and (3) there is sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.

Tubbs v. State, 263 Ga. App. 270, 271 ( 587 SE2d 329) (2003), citing McKibbons v. State, 226 Ga. App. 452, 454-455 (3) ( 486 SE2d 679) (1997). Further, we will not disturb a trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible absent an abuse of discretion. Tubbs, supra.

In this case, evidence of three similar transactions was admitted to show bent of mind and course of conduct. Cain does not argue that he did not commit the similar offenses or that the evidence was admitted for an inappropriate purpose. Rather, he argues that the evidence was inadmissible because the transactions were not sufficiently similar to the crimes charged.

The first similar transaction took place on September 10, 1992, when a police officer observed Cain in a car with a known prostitute driving in south Atlanta. Cain was arrested after the officer saw him throw the prostitute from the car, and he fled from the officer on foot. The car, which had a broken steering column, was stolen. A certified copy of Cain's conviction for theft by receiving was admitted into evidence.

The second offense occurred on August 14, 1993, when Cain was discovered driving a stolen car. Again, he was convicted of theft by receiving, and a certified copy of the conviction was admitted.

The state introduced evidence of the third similar transaction through the testimony of Adele Clary. She testified that on February 13, 1994, a man knocked on her door and informed her that she had a broken windshield on her car. When she went outside, the man showed her a gun and demanded that she give him her keys. She complied. Cain was subsequently arrested and identified by Clary. He was indicted for armed robbery and entered a guilty plea to the offense of robbery.

Contrary to Cain's argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence. "When similar transaction evidence is being introduced to prove motive, intent, or bent of mind, it requires a lesser degree of similarity to meet the test of admissibility than when such evidence is being introduced to prove identity." (Citation omitted.) Fields v. State, 223 Ga. App. 569, 571 (2) ( 479 SE2d 393) (1996). All that is required is that the incidents are sufficiently similar such that "proof of the earlier event helps prove an element of the later crime." (Citation omitted.) Tubbs, supra at 273. Here, the earlier incidents were sufficiently similar to show that Cain had a course of conduct and bent of mind to steal cars, particularly in the southwest area of Atlanta. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the similar transaction evidence.

Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P.J., and Barnes, J., concur.